294 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
294 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
# grok-glance
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A Grok Build plugin that puts a small web dashboard behind a passkey, so you can glance at what
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an agent is doing from your phone — and tap **approve** or **deny** when it wants to run something
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risky.
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It is deliberately small: read-only, plus remote approve/deny. It cannot send prompts, edit files,
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or drive a session.
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```
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┌────────────────────────────┐
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│ ● grok-glance 2 sessions│
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├────────────────────────────┤
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│ Waiting on you 62s │
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│ Bash · in remote-grok │
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│ rm -rf ./dist │
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│ ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓░░░░░░░░░░░ │
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│ [ Deny ] [ Approve ] │
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├────────────────────────────┤
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│ remote-grok working │
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│ ~/src/remote-grok │
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│ Last asked: fix the flaky │
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│ ⟳ Read 4s │
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│ server/src/state.ts │
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│ 12 tools 0 failed 0 ✗ │
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├────────────────────────────┤
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│ Activity │
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│ ● Read state.ts 14:22 │
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│ ● Bash npm test 14:21 │
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└────────────────────────────┘
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```
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## Requirements
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- Node.js 20 or newer, and npm.
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- Grok Build.
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- For phone access: [Tailscale](https://tailscale.com/) on both the machine and the phone. See
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[Why Tailscale](#why-tailscale-and-not-just-the-lan-ip) — a LAN IP genuinely cannot work.
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## Install
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```sh
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git clone <this repo> grok-glance
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cd grok-glance
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npm install && npm run build
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```
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The build produces `dist/server` (the daemon) and `dist/web` (the dashboard). Both are required;
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the daemon serves the dashboard itself.
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Then register the directory with Grok Build. Plugins are installed from a marketplace catalog, so
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for a local checkout the shortest path is a one-entry catalog. Create
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`.grok-plugin/marketplace.json` in a directory that contains your checkout:
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```json
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{
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"name": "local",
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"description": "Local plugins",
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"owner": { "name": "me" },
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"plugins": [
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{
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"name": "grok-glance",
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"description": "Passkey-guarded phone dashboard for Grok Build.",
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"category": "monitoring",
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"source": { "type": "local", "path": "./grok-glance" }
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}
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]
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}
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```
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…then add that marketplace and install `grok-glance` from Grok Build's `/plugin` interface.
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Once installed, the daemon starts by itself: the `SessionStart` hook boots it in the background on
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the first session after installation.
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## Get it onto your phone
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The daemon binds to `127.0.0.1` only and never opens a port to your network. Tailscale Serve
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publishes it inside your tailnet with real TLS:
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```sh
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tailscale serve --bg 127.0.0.1:8791
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tailscale serve status # note the https://<box>.<tailnet>.ts.net URL
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```
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Tell grok-glance which origin it is being served on — this is also the WebAuthn relying-party ID,
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so it has to be exact:
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```sh
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node bin/glance set-origin https://<box>.<tailnet>.ts.net
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```
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## Enrol the phone
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```sh
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node bin/glance enroll
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```
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That prints a URL and an 8-character code, good for 10 minutes, single use:
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```
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Open this on your phone:
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https://mybox.tailnet-1234.ts.net/?enroll
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Enrollment code: K7QM4RTX
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Valid for: 10 minutes (single use)
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```
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Open the URL on the phone, type the code, tap **Create passkey**, and confirm with Face ID / a
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fingerprint / the device PIN. From then on the phone unlocks the dashboard with that passkey and
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nothing else gets in.
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Repeat for each device you want. `node bin/glance devices` lists them; `node bin/glance revoke
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<id-prefix>` removes one (and kills its live session immediately).
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## What the dashboard shows
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- **Now** — the workspace, its state (working / waiting on you / idle / error / ended), the last
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thing you asked, the tool currently running with a live elapsed timer, and running counts of
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tools, failures and denials.
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- **Sessions** — one row per live session when there is more than one; tap to filter.
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- **Activity** — a timeline of prompts, tool calls with durations, failures, permission denials,
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notifications, subagents, compactions, session start/end.
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- **Pending approvals** — a card per waiting tool call, with the command, a countdown, and two
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large buttons.
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Updates arrive over Server-Sent Events. The server sends whole snapshots rather than deltas, so a
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phone that slept through twenty events still wakes up showing the truth.
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## Remote approve / deny
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Off by default. Turn it on from the phone's settings panel, or:
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```sh
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node bin/glance approval risky # Bash, Write, Edit, MultiEdit, NotebookEdit
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node bin/glance approval all # every tool call — noisy
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node bin/glance approval off
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```
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Defaults worth knowing:
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| Behaviour | Default | Changeable from the phone | Why |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| Only wait when a phone is watching | on | yes | Otherwise a closed browser tab stalls the agent for 90s per tool call. |
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| On timeout | allow | yes | Flip to *deny* if you would rather fail closed. |
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| Timeout | 90s | no — edit `config.json` | The hook's own timeout is 125s; raising this past that would just make the hook give up first. |
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| Risky-tool pattern | `^(Bash\|Write\|Edit\|MultiEdit\|NotebookEdit)$` | no — edit `config.json` | Shown on the phone but not editable: a typo'd regex would silently change what gets gated. |
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**This is a convenience gate, not a security boundary.** Every failure path is fail-open: daemon
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down, hook timeout, malformed response, port mismatch — the tool call proceeds. If you need calls
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actually blocked, use Grok Build's own permission settings.
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## CLI
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`bin/glance` is plain Node with no dependencies. Run it as `node bin/glance <command>`.
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| Command | What it does |
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| `status` | Running? On which origin, with how many devices? |
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| `up` | Start the daemon in the background |
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| `serve` | Run it in the foreground (for debugging) |
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| `stop` | Stop it |
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| `logs` | Last 60 lines of the daemon log |
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| `enroll` | Mint a one-time enrolment code and URL |
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| `set-origin <url>` | Set the public https origin and RP ID |
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| `devices` | List enrolled devices |
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| `revoke <id-prefix>` | Revoke a device |
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| `approval <off\|risky\|all>` | Set the approval policy |
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| `sync-hooks` | Rewrite hook URLs after changing the port |
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## Files and configuration
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Everything lives in `~/.grok/glance` (mode 0700), or `$GLANCE_HOME` if you set it:
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| File | Contents |
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| `config.json` | Port, bind host, public origin, RP ID, approval settings |
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| `credentials.json` | Enrolled passkeys — credential IDs, public keys, counters. No secrets of yours. |
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| `auth-sessions.json` | Live dashboard sessions, stored as SHA-256 hashes of the cookie tokens |
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| `secret.key` | 32-byte HMAC key used to sign session cookies |
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| `admin.token` | Rotated every daemon start; authenticates the CLI |
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| `events.jsonl` | Append-only event log, one JSON object per line, rotated at 5 MB |
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| `daemon.log` | Daemon stdout/stderr |
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Three environment variables override `config.json`, which is mostly useful for testing a second
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instance without touching your real one:
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| Variable | Effect |
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| `GLANCE_HOME` | Where all of the above lives. Read by the daemon, the CLI, and the hook scripts. |
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| `GLANCE_PORT` | Port to listen on (and, for the CLI and hooks, to talk to) |
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| `GLANCE_ORIGIN` | Public origin, as if set with `set-origin` — but not persisted |
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To change the port, edit `config.json`, then run `node bin/glance sync-hooks` so the hook URLs in
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`hooks/hooks.json` match. Restart the daemon afterwards.
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## Security notes
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**Network surface.** The daemon listens on `127.0.0.1:8791` and makes no outbound connections of
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its own. Three classes of caller:
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| Path | Caller | Authentication |
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| `/hook/record`, `/hook/approve` | Grok Build's hooks, from this machine | none — loopback only |
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| `/api/*`, `/events` | the dashboard | passkey session cookie + CSRF header |
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| `/local/*` | the `glance` CLI | rotating admin token from `admin.token` |
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`/local/*` is token-gated rather than "is it from localhost", because `tailscale serve` proxies
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remote traffic to `127.0.0.1` — the daemon cannot tell a local caller from a tunnelled one by
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address alone.
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**Session cookie** is `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Strict`, HMAC-signed, and `Secure` whenever the request
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arrived over https. Only a SHA-256 hash of the token is stored, compared in constant time. Sessions
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last 30 days; revoking a device drops its session at once.
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**Cross-site defence.** Every POST must carry exactly `content-type: application/json`, which is
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not a CORS-safelisted type, so a hostile page cannot post here without a preflight that is never
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answered. `/api/*` additionally requires an `x-glance-csrf` header. The pages themselves are served
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with a strict CSP (`script-src 'self'`, no framing, no form actions) and `no-store`.
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**User verification is required**, for both enrolment and sign-in: the phone asks for a biometric
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or PIN every time, so a stolen unlocked phone is not automatically a way in. Passkeys are created
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as resident keys, so the phone offers the right one without you typing a username.
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**Rate limits.** Authentication attempts are capped (40 per 5 minutes), enrolment attempts more
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tightly (12 per 5 minutes, and a code burns itself after 5 wrong guesses). The limiter is keyed
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globally on purpose: behind a tunnel every request arrives from `127.0.0.1`, so per-IP buckets
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would be one bucket wearing a hat.
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**What crosses the wire.** Tool names, truncated arguments, prompt first lines, file paths,
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durations, and exit statuses — a summary, not a transcript. Known secret shapes are redacted before
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storage: `sk-`/`rk-`/`pk-` keys, `xai-` keys, GitHub and Slack tokens, AWS access key IDs, JWTs,
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PEM private-key blocks, `Authorization:`/`Bearer` headers, and `password`/`secret`/`token`/`api_key`
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assignments. This is a filter, not a guarantee — a secret in an unusual shape will show up in the
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timeline. Treat the dashboard as being as sensitive as your terminal.
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**Threat model.** grok-glance assumes the machine it runs on is trusted. It protects against
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someone else on your tailnet, or a browser tab you left open, reaching the dashboard. It does not
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protect against a local attacker who can read `~/.grok/glance` — with `admin.token` they can enrol
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their own device.
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### Why Tailscale, and not just the LAN IP?
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WebAuthn will not run outside a secure context, and — separately — a bare IP address cannot be a
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relying-party ID. So `http://192.168.1.20:8791` can never hold a passkey, no matter what the
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browser is willing to render. You need a hostname with valid TLS. Tailscale Serve gives you one for
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free, with the tunnel closed to everything outside your tailnet.
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Any other route to a real https hostname works too: set `origin` in `config.json` (or use
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`set-origin`) to whatever your reverse proxy terminates on. If you put grok-glance behind a proxy
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reachable from the public internet, the passkey gate is the only thing standing in front of it.
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Changing the origin changes the RP ID, and **passkeys are bound to the RP ID** — existing devices
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stop working and must be enrolled again.
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## Hook wiring
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`hooks/hooks.json` subscribes to all 14 lifecycle events. Passive events use `type: "http"`: they
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POST straight into the daemon with no process spawn, so they cost close to nothing per tool call
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and quietly do nothing when the daemon is down.
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Two exceptions:
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- `SessionStart` runs `bin/glance-up.mjs`, which is what boots the daemon.
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- `PreToolUse` is wired **twice** — an `http` entry that records every call for the timeline, and a
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`command` entry matching only `^(Bash|Write|Edit|MultiEdit|NotebookEdit)$` that runs
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`bin/glance-approve.mjs`. PreToolUse is the only blocking event, and a command hook is the only
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documented way to return a deny decision, so the gate has to be a spawned process; keeping the
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match narrow means the cost is paid only for calls that could actually need a tap.
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The hook scripts use nothing but the Node standard library and always exit 0 unless they are
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deliberately denying.
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## Deliberately omitted
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Not oversights — decisions:
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- **Sending prompts or steering the session.** Hooks cannot inject input, so a phone-to-agent
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channel would need a second transport and a much larger threat model.
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- **Full transcripts and tool output.** Summaries only. Streaming assistant text through a phone
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would mean shipping your codebase through it.
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- **Push notifications.** Needs a VAPID key, a service worker, and a subscription store, for a
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dashboard you open on purpose.
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- **Multi-user accounts and roles.** One user, several devices.
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- **Diff views, file browsing, cost/token charts, log search, session resume.** All out of scope
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for a glance.
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- **Editing the risky-tool pattern from the phone.** Shown but not editable: a typo'd regex there
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would silently change what gets gated. Edit `config.json` instead.
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## Licence
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MIT.
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