Authenticate /hook/*, and make every hook a command hook

/hook/record and /hook/approve accepted anything that reached the port. That is not "loopback only": `tailscale serve` proxies tailnet traffic to 127.0.0.1, so anyone who could reach the tunnel could forge timeline events and answer approval prompts. Both endpoints now require a 32-byte secret from $GLANCE_HOME/hook.secret (0600, created once, never rotated so nothing in flight is 403'd mid-session), compared in constant time before the body is read, as an x-glance-hook header or a ?k= parameter. Requests carrying x-forwarded-* are refused outright: a local hook process never sends them and a tunnelled caller always does. The check applies to /hook/* only, so the dashboard is unaffected. While wiring that up: the 13 passive `type: "http"` hooks could never have worked. Grok Build's http runner rejects every scheme but https, then resolves the host and blocks private/link-local/CGNAT addresses (validate_hook_url + is_blocked_ip), so neither loopback-over-http nor *.ts.net (100.64/10) can be a hook target - and it sends no header but Content-Type, so such a hook could not authenticate anyway. They were failing validation silently on every event. All of them are now command hooks running bin/glance-record.mjs, which costs a Node start and can present the secret. hooks.json is generated from hooks/hooks.template.json by scripts/gen-hooks.mjs (npm run build, glance sync-hooks). It creates the secret, derives the approval hook's timeout from approval.timeoutMs instead of hand-copying 125, and refuses to write a hook that cannot fire: bad type, non-positive timeout, non-https http URL, missing bin/ script, or a leftover placeholder. A template that embeds the token makes the output 0600 with a warning. Fail-open is unchanged: a missing, stale or rejected secret degrades to "no telemetry", and glance-approve.mjs still allows on every error path. glance status warns when the on-disk secret no longer matches the daemon's. Validated with the e2e suite (190 checks, including no-token/wrong-token/ same-length-token 403s, ?k= acceptance, x-forwarded-* refusal, and the recorder's fail-open paths) and a clean npm run build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 04:52:17 +00:00
parent b3b6bf3f70
commit 5eec1940be
15 changed files with 661 additions and 81 deletions
@@ -46,7 +46,10 @@ npm install && npm run build
 ```

 The build produces `dist/server` (the daemon) and `dist/web` (the dashboard). Both are required;
-the daemon serves the dashboard itself.
+the daemon serves the dashboard itself. It also generates `hooks/hooks.json` from
+`hooks/hooks.template.json`, and creates `~/.grok/glance/hook.secret` (mode 0600) if it does not
+exist yet — the shared secret the hook scripts authenticate with. Neither the secret nor anything
+derived from it ends up in `hooks.json`.

 Then register the directory with Grok Build. Plugins are installed from a marketplace catalog, so
 for a local checkout the shortest path is a one-entry catalog. Create
@@ -144,12 +147,13 @@ Defaults worth knowing:
 |---|---|---|---|
 | Only wait when a phone is watching | on | yes | Otherwise a closed browser tab stalls the agent for 90s per tool call. |
 | On timeout | allow | yes | Flip to *deny* if you would rather fail closed. |
-| Timeout | 90s | no — edit `config.json` | The hook's own timeout is 125s; raising this past that would just make the hook give up first. |
+| Timeout | 90s | no — edit `config.json` | The hook's own timeout is derived from this (`+35s` of slack) when `hooks.json` is generated, so re-run `sync-hooks` after changing it. |
 | Risky-tool pattern | `^(Bash\|Write\|Edit\|MultiEdit\|NotebookEdit)$` | no — edit `config.json` | Shown on the phone but not editable: a typo'd regex would silently change what gets gated. |

 **This is a convenience gate, not a security boundary.** Every failure path is fail-open: daemon
-down, hook timeout, malformed response, port mismatch — the tool call proceeds. If you need calls
-actually blocked, use Grok Build's own permission settings.
+down, hook timeout, malformed response, port mismatch, a hook secret the daemon no longer
+recognises — the tool call proceeds. If you need calls actually blocked, use Grok Build's own
+permission settings.

 ## CLI

@@ -167,7 +171,7 @@ actually blocked, use Grok Build's own permission settings.
 | `devices` | List enrolled devices |
 | `revoke <id-prefix>` | Revoke a device |
 | `approval <off\|risky\|all>` | Set the approval policy |
-| `sync-hooks` | Rewrite hook URLs after changing the port |
+| `sync-hooks` | Regenerate `hooks/hooks.json` from the template (after changing `config.json`) |

 ## Files and configuration

@@ -180,6 +184,7 @@ Everything lives in `~/.grok/glance` (mode 0700), or `$GLANCE_HOME` if you set i
 | `auth-sessions.json` | Live dashboard sessions, stored as SHA-256 hashes of the cookie tokens |
 | `secret.key` | 32-byte HMAC key used to sign session cookies |
 | `admin.token` | Rotated every daemon start; authenticates the CLI |
+| `hook.secret` | Shared secret the hook scripts present on `/hook/*`. Created once, mode 0600, never rotated — a rotation mid-session would 403 whatever was already in flight. Delete it and the daemon mints a new one on its next start; hooks then need that restart to agree again, which `glance status` will tell you about. |
 | `events.jsonl` | Append-only event log, one JSON object per line, rotated at 5 MB |
 | `daemon.log` | Daemon stdout/stderr |

@@ -192,8 +197,10 @@ instance without touching your real one:
 | `GLANCE_PORT` | Port to listen on (and, for the CLI and hooks, to talk to) |
 | `GLANCE_ORIGIN` | Public origin, as if set with `set-origin` — but not persisted |

-To change the port, edit `config.json`, then run `node bin/glance sync-hooks` so the hook URLs in
-`hooks/hooks.json` match. Restart the daemon afterwards.
+The port is not baked into `hooks/hooks.json` — the hook scripts read `config.json` themselves — so
+changing it needs nothing but a daemon restart. Changing `approval.timeoutMs` does affect the
+generated file: run `node bin/glance sync-hooks` afterwards so the approval hook's own timeout still
+outlasts the wait.

 ## Security notes

@@ -202,13 +209,20 @@ its own. Three classes of caller:

 | Path | Caller | Authentication |
 |---|---|---|
-| `/hook/record`, `/hook/approve` | Grok Build's hooks, from this machine | none — loopback only |
+| `/hook/record`, `/hook/approve` | Grok Build's hooks, from this machine | shared secret from `hook.secret`, plus a refusal of any proxied request |
 | `/api/*`, `/events` | the dashboard | passkey session cookie + CSRF header |
 | `/local/*` | the `glance` CLI | rotating admin token from `admin.token` |

-`/local/*` is token-gated rather than "is it from localhost", because `tailscale serve` proxies
-remote traffic to `127.0.0.1` — the daemon cannot tell a local caller from a tunnelled one by
-address alone.
+None of the three trusts the source address, because `tailscale serve` proxies remote traffic to
+`127.0.0.1` — the daemon cannot tell a local caller from a tunnelled one by address alone. Without
+the hook secret, anyone who could reach the tunnel could forge timeline events and answer approval
+prompts on your behalf; `/hook/*` compares the secret in constant time before it reads a body, and
+additionally refuses any request carrying `x-forwarded-for` or `x-forwarded-proto`, which a local
+hook process never sends and a tunnelled caller always does.
+
+That refusal costs nothing, because no legitimate hook traffic comes through the tunnel: hooks are
+local processes talking to loopback. It applies **only** to `/hook/*` — the dashboard arrives
+through `tailscale serve` with those headers on every request and is unaffected.

 **Session cookie** is `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Strict`, HMAC-signed, and `Secure` whenever the request
 arrived over https. Only a SHA-256 hash of the token is stored, compared in constant time. Sessions
@@ -256,21 +270,36 @@ stop working and must be enrolled again.

 ## Hook wiring

-`hooks/hooks.json` subscribes to all 14 lifecycle events. Passive events use `type: "http"`: they
-POST straight into the daemon with no process spawn, so they cost close to nothing per tool call
-and quietly do nothing when the daemon is down.
+`hooks/hooks.json` subscribes to all 14 lifecycle events, and **is generated** — from
+`hooks/hooks.template.json` by `scripts/gen-hooks.mjs`, which runs as part of `npm run build` and on
+`node bin/glance sync-hooks`. Edit the template, not the output.

-Two exceptions:
+Every entry is a `command` hook. That is not a style choice: an `http` hook cannot reach this daemon
+by any route. Grok Build's http runner rejects every scheme but `https`, then **resolves the host**
+and refuses the resolved address if it is private, link-local or CGNAT
+(`xai-grok-hooks/src/runner/http.rs`, `validate_hook_url` + `is_blocked_ip`). Plain http on loopback
+fails the scheme check; the tailnet fails the address check, because `*.ts.net` resolves into
+`100.64/10` (and `fd7a::/48`, inside the blocked `fc00::/7`). On top of that the runner sends no
+request header but `Content-Type`, with no configuration surface for one, so such a hook could not
+authenticate itself even if it could connect. The generator refuses to emit an `http` handler whose
+URL is not `https://`, because the alternative is what this plugin shipped for a while: 13 passive
+hooks that failed validation silently on every event.
+
+A command hook has none of those problems. It is a local process, so no URL is validated, nothing
+traverses the tunnel, and it can present the shared secret — hook traffic goes straight to
+`http://127.0.0.1:8791` and never leaves the machine. So each observed event runs
+`bin/glance-record.mjs`, which costs a Node start (~40 ms) and POSTs one event. Two entries differ:

 - `SessionStart` runs `bin/glance-up.mjs`, which is what boots the daemon.
- `PreToolUse` is wired **twice** — an `http` entry that records every call for the timeline, and a
-  `command` entry matching only `^(Bash|Write|Edit|MultiEdit|NotebookEdit)$` that runs
-  `bin/glance-approve.mjs`. PreToolUse is the only blocking event, and a command hook is the only
-  documented way to return a deny decision, so the gate has to be a spawned process; keeping the
-  match narrow means the cost is paid only for calls that could actually need a tap.
+- `PreToolUse` is wired **twice** — a recording entry for the timeline, and a second entry matching
+  only `^(Bash|Write|Edit|MultiEdit|NotebookEdit)$` that runs `bin/glance-approve.mjs`. PreToolUse
+  is the only blocking event, and a command hook is the only documented way to return a deny
+  decision; keeping the match narrow means the gate's cost is paid only for calls that could
+  actually need a tap. Its `timeout` is derived from `approval.timeoutMs` at generation time rather
+  than hand-copied, which is the other thing `sync-hooks` refreshes.

 The hook scripts use nothing but the Node standard library and always exit 0 unless they are
-deliberately denying.
+deliberately denying — including when the daemon rejects their token.

 ## Deliberately omitted

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@

 import fs from "node:fs";
 import path from "node:path";
-import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
+import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
 import {
  PLUGIN_ROOT,
  baseUrl,
@@ -124,6 +124,12 @@ switch (cmd) {
    console.log(`  watchers      : ${s.watchers}`);
    console.log(`  sessions      : ${s.sessions}`);
    console.log(`  events kept   : ${s.events}`);
+    if (s.hookAuthOk === false) {
+      console.log(
+        "\n  ! hook auth mismatch: $GLANCE_HOME/hook.secret no longer matches what the daemon" +
+          "\n    loaded, so events are being dropped. Restart it: glance stop && glance up",
+      );
+    }
    if (s.devices === 0) console.log("\nNo device enrolled yet. Run: glance enroll");
    break;
  }
@@ -200,22 +206,19 @@ switch (cmd) {
  }

  case "sync-hooks": {
-    const file = path.join(PLUGIN_ROOT, "hooks", "hooks.json");
-    const doc = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8"));
-    let changed = 0;
-    for (const groups of Object.values(doc.hooks ?? {})) {
-      for (const group of groups) {
-        for (const h of group.hooks ?? []) {
-          if (h.type === "http" && typeof h.url === "string") {
-            const next = h.url.replace(/127\.0\.0\.1:\d+/, `127.0.0.1:${cfg.port}`);
-            if (next !== h.url) changed++;
-            h.url = next;
+    // hooks.json is generated, not edited: regenerate it from hooks/hooks.template.json.
+    // The port is not baked into it any more — the hook scripts read config.json themselves —
+    // so the thing this actually refreshes is the approval gate's timeout, plus the hook
+    // secret if it has gone missing.
+    const { status } = spawnSync(
+      process.execPath,
+      [path.join(PLUGIN_ROOT, "scripts", "gen-hooks.mjs")],
+      { stdio: "inherit" },
+    );
+    if (status !== 0) process.exit(status ?? 1);
+    if (await isDaemonUp(cfg)) {
+      console.log("restart the daemon to pick up config changes: glance stop && glance up");
    }
-        }
-      }
-    }
-    fs.writeFileSync(file, JSON.stringify(doc, null, 2) + "\n");
-    console.log(`rewrote ${changed} hook url(s) to port ${cfg.port}`);
    break;
  }

@@ -241,7 +244,7 @@ switch (cmd) {
  glance devices                list enrolled devices
  glance revoke <id-prefix>     revoke a device
  glance approval <off|risky|all>   remote approval policy
-  glance sync-hooks             rewrite hook urls after a port change
+  glance sync-hooks             regenerate hooks/hooks.json from the template
  glance logs                   tail the daemon log
 `);
 }
@@ -10,7 +10,15 @@
 * call Grok was already about to make. This hook can never introduce a new command.
 */

-import { baseUrl, envEnvelope, postJson, readConfig, readStdinJson } from "./glance-lib.mjs";
+import {
+  approvalHookTimeoutSecs,
+  baseUrl,
+  envEnvelope,
+  hookHeaders,
+  postJson,
+  readConfig,
+  readStdinJson,
+} from "./glance-lib.mjs";

 function allow() {
  process.exit(0);
@@ -28,11 +36,20 @@ function deny(reason) {
 const payload = envEnvelope(await readStdinJson());
 const cfg = readConfig();

-// Stay inside the hook timeout declared in hooks/hooks.json (125s).
-const waitMs = Math.min(115_000, Number(cfg.approval?.timeoutMs ?? 90_000) + 15_000);
+// Finish inside the hook timeout that scripts/gen-hooks.mjs wrote into hooks.json, with room
+// to spare: if Grok Build kills us first, the fail-open path below never gets to run.
+const waitMs = Math.min(
+  approvalHookTimeoutSecs(cfg) * 1000 - 10_000,
+  Number(cfg.approval?.timeoutMs ?? 90_000) + 15_000,
+);

 try {
-  const { data } = await postJson(`${baseUrl(cfg)}/hook/approve`, payload, waitMs);
+  const { data } = await postJson(
+    `${baseUrl(cfg)}/hook/approve`,
+    payload,
+    waitMs,
+    hookHeaders(),
+  );
  if (data && data.decision === "deny") deny(data.reason);
  allow();
 } catch {
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 import fs from "node:fs";
 import path from "node:path";
 import os from "node:os";
+import crypto from "node:crypto";
 import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";

 export const PLUGIN_ROOT = path.resolve(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url), "../..");
@@ -43,6 +44,62 @@ export function baseUrl(cfg = readConfig()) {
  return `http://127.0.0.1:${cfg.port}`;
 }

+/** Header the daemon expects on /hook/*; kept in step with server/src/auth.ts. */
+export const HOOK_HEADER = "x-glance-hook";
+
+/**
+ * The shared secret that admits a caller to /hook/*. Read fresh on every invocation so a
+ * regenerated secret is picked up without touching hooks.json.
+ *
+ * `create` is used by the build-time generator; the hook scripts pass false and simply get
+ * null when there is no secret yet. That is deliberate: a hook must never be the thing that
+ * creates state, and a missing secret has to degrade to "no telemetry", not "no tool call".
+ */
+export function hookSecret({ create = false } = {}) {
+  const file = path.join(glanceHome(), "hook.secret");
+  for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 2; attempt++) {
+    try {
+      const existing = fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8").trim();
+      if (existing) return existing;
+    } catch {
+      /* fall through */
+    }
+    if (!create) return null;
+    fs.mkdirSync(glanceHome(), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+    const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
+    try {
+      // Exclusive: if the daemon created one a millisecond ago, read theirs instead.
+      fs.writeFileSync(file, token + "\n", { mode: 0o600, flag: "wx" });
+      return token;
+    } catch {
+      /* lost the race; loop re-reads */
+    }
+  }
+  try {
+    return fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8").trim() || null;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+export function hookHeaders() {
+  const token = hookSecret();
+  return token ? { [HOOK_HEADER]: token } : {};
+}
+
+/**
+ * How long the PreToolUse approval hook is allowed to run, in seconds.
+ *
+ * One formula, two consumers: scripts/gen-hooks.mjs writes it into hooks.json as the hook's
+ * `timeout`, and glance-approve.mjs derives its own wait from it. They must agree — if the
+ * script outlives its hook timeout, Grok Build kills it and the fail-open path never runs.
+ */
+export function approvalHookTimeoutSecs(cfg = readConfig()) {
+  const ms = Number(cfg.approval?.timeoutMs ?? 90_000);
+  const base = Number.isFinite(ms) && ms > 0 ? ms : 90_000;
+  return Math.ceil(base / 1000) + 35;
+}
+
 /** Read the hook payload that Grok Build writes to stdin. Returns {} if there is none. */
 export async function readStdinJson() {
  if (process.stdin.isTTY) return {};
@@ -77,10 +134,10 @@ export function envEnvelope(payload) {
  };
 }

-export async function postJson(url, body, timeoutMs) {
+export async function postJson(url, body, timeoutMs, extraHeaders = {}) {
  const res = await fetch(url, {
    method: "POST",
-    headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+    headers: { "content-type": "application/json", ...extraHeaders },
    body: JSON.stringify(body),
    signal: AbortSignal.timeout(timeoutMs),
  });
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+/**
+ * Passive recorder hook: POST one lifecycle event into the daemon and get out of the way.
+ *
+ * Wired to every observed event. This used to be a `type: "http"` hook — no process spawn at
+ * all — until it turned out that Grok Build's http runner validates the URL against its SSRF
+ * rules and rejects any scheme that is not https (crates/codegen/xai-grok-hooks/src/runner/
+ * http.rs, `validate_hook_url`). The daemon speaks plain http on loopback, so an http hook
+ * could never reach it: those hooks were failing validation, silently, on every event.
+ *
+ * A command hook costs a Node start (~40ms) per event, and buys back the ability to send an
+ * authentication header, which the http runner has no config surface for.
+ *
+ * Always exits 0. A dashboard must never be the reason a tool call fails.
+ */
+
+import {
+  baseUrl,
+  envEnvelope,
+  hookHeaders,
+  postJson,
+  readConfig,
+  readStdinJson,
+} from "./glance-lib.mjs";
+
+try {
+  const payload = envEnvelope(await readStdinJson());
+  const cfg = readConfig();
+  // Short: if the daemon is not listening this must fail fast, not hold up the tool call.
+  await postJson(`${baseUrl(cfg)}/hook/record`, payload, 2000, hookHeaders());
+} catch {
+  // Daemon down, no secret yet, malformed payload — all the same answer: carry on.
+}
+
+process.exit(0);
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import {
  baseUrl,
  envEnvelope,
  glanceHome,
+  hookHeaders,
  isDaemonUp,
  postJson,
  readConfig,
@@ -59,7 +60,9 @@ const cfg = readConfig();
 try {
  const up = await ensureDaemon(cfg);
  if (up) {
-    await postJson(`${baseUrl(cfg)}/hook/record`, payload, 2500);
+    // hookHeaders() is read here, not at import time: on a first-ever run the daemon we just
+    // spawned is what created hook.secret.
+    await postJson(`${baseUrl(cfg)}/hook/record`, payload, 2500, hookHeaders());
  }
 } catch {
  // Fail open, always.
@@ -1,14 +1,39 @@
 {
  "_comment": [
-    "grok-glance hook wiring.",
-    "Passive events use type=http: they POST straight into the daemon with no process spawn,",
-    "so they cost ~nothing per tool call and fail open if the daemon is not running.",
-    "SessionStart uses type=command because it is what boots the daemon.",
-    "PreToolUse is wired twice on purpose: an http entry records every tool call for the",
-    "timeline, and a command entry gates only risky tools, because only a command hook has a",
-    "documented way to return a deny decision.",
-    "If you change the port in ~/.grok/glance/config.json, run `glance sync-hooks` to rewrite",
-    "the URLs below, or edit them by hand."
+    "TEMPLATE. Do not edit hooks/hooks.json by hand - it is generated from this file by",
+    "`scripts/gen-hooks.mjs`, which runs as part of `npm run build` and on `glance sync-hooks`.",
+    "",
+    "Everything is a `command` hook, including the 13 passive recorders. That is not a style",
+    "choice: an `http` hook cannot reach this daemon by any route. Grok Build's http runner",
+    "(xai-grok-hooks/src/runner/http.rs, `validate_hook_url`) rejects every scheme but https,",
+    "then resolves the host and refuses the resolved address if it is private, link-local or",
+    "CGNAT - so plain http on loopback is out, and so is the tailnet, because *.ts.net resolves",
+    "into 100.64/10 (and fd7a::/48, inside the blocked fc00::/7). Pointing a hook at the public",
+    "https origin therefore fails upstream, before a request is ever sent. The runner also sends",
+    "no request header but Content-Type, so such a hook could not authenticate itself even if it",
+    "could connect.",
+    "",
+    "A command hook has none of those problems: it is a local process, so there is no URL to",
+    "validate, no proxy in the path, and it can present the shared secret. It costs one Node",
+    "start (~40ms) per event.",
+    "",
+    "SessionStart boots the daemon. PreToolUse is wired twice on purpose: one entry records",
+    "every call for the timeline, and a second, narrowly matched entry runs the approval gate,",
+    "because PreToolUse is the only blocking event and only a command hook can return a deny.",
+    "",
+    "Placeholders, written in the template as a name wrapped in double braces:",
+    "  APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_SECS  derived from approval.timeoutMs in ~/.grok/glance/config.json.",
+    "  HOOK_TOKEN             the secret from ~/.grok/glance/hook.secret, for a caller that",
+    "                         cannot set a header: the daemon accepts it as a ?k= query",
+    "                         parameter too. Nothing below uses it and no http hook can (see",
+    "                         above); it stays because the daemon's ?k= path is real. Note the",
+    "                         daemon also refuses any /hook/* request carrying x-forwarded-*,",
+    "                         so a reverse-proxied transport is out as well. Using this",
+    "                         placeholder makes the generated hooks.json secret-bearing, so",
+    "                         gen-hooks writes it 0600 and it must not be committed.",
+    "",
+    "Do not spell those names with their braces anywhere in this comment block: the comment is",
+    "copied verbatim into hooks.json, and substitution would happily expand it there too."
  ],
  "hooks": {
    "SessionStart": [
@@ -26,9 +51,9 @@
      {
        "hooks": [
          {
-            "type": "http",
-            "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8791/hook/record",
-            "timeout": 3
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"",
+            "timeout": 5
          }
        ]
      },
@@ -45,62 +70,86 @@
    ],
    "PostToolUse": [
      {
-        "hooks": [{ "type": "http", "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8791/hook/record", "timeout": 3 }]
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
      }
    ],
    "PostToolUseFailure": [
      {
-        "hooks": [{ "type": "http", "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8791/hook/record", "timeout": 3 }]
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
      }
    ],
    "UserPromptSubmit": [
      {
-        "hooks": [{ "type": "http", "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8791/hook/record", "timeout": 3 }]
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
      }
    ],
    "PermissionDenied": [
      {
-        "hooks": [{ "type": "http", "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8791/hook/record", "timeout": 3 }]
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
      }
    ],
    "Notification": [
      {
-        "hooks": [{ "type": "http", "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8791/hook/record", "timeout": 3 }]
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
      }
    ],
    "Stop": [
      {
-        "hooks": [{ "type": "http", "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8791/hook/record", "timeout": 3 }]
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
      }
    ],
    "StopFailure": [
      {
-        "hooks": [{ "type": "http", "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8791/hook/record", "timeout": 3 }]
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
      }
    ],
    "SubagentStart": [
      {
-        "hooks": [{ "type": "http", "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8791/hook/record", "timeout": 3 }]
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
      }
    ],
    "SubagentStop": [
      {
-        "hooks": [{ "type": "http", "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8791/hook/record", "timeout": 3 }]
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
      }
    ],
    "PreCompact": [
      {
-        "hooks": [{ "type": "http", "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8791/hook/record", "timeout": 3 }]
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
      }
    ],
    "PostCompact": [
      {
-        "hooks": [{ "type": "http", "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8791/hook/record", "timeout": 3 }]
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
      }
    ],
    "SessionEnd": [
      {
-        "hooks": [{ "type": "http", "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8791/hook/record", "timeout": 3 }]
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
      }
    ]
  }
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+{
+  "_comment": [
+    "TEMPLATE. Do not edit hooks/hooks.json by hand - it is generated from this file by",
+    "`scripts/gen-hooks.mjs`, which runs as part of `npm run build` and on `glance sync-hooks`.",
+    "",
+    "Everything is a `command` hook, including the 13 passive recorders. That is not a style",
+    "choice: an `http` hook cannot reach this daemon by any route. Grok Build's http runner",
+    "(xai-grok-hooks/src/runner/http.rs, `validate_hook_url`) rejects every scheme but https,",
+    "then resolves the host and refuses the resolved address if it is private, link-local or",
+    "CGNAT - so plain http on loopback is out, and so is the tailnet, because *.ts.net resolves",
+    "into 100.64/10 (and fd7a::/48, inside the blocked fc00::/7). Pointing a hook at the public",
+    "https origin therefore fails upstream, before a request is ever sent. The runner also sends",
+    "no request header but Content-Type, so such a hook could not authenticate itself even if it",
+    "could connect.",
+    "",
+    "A command hook has none of those problems: it is a local process, so there is no URL to",
+    "validate, no proxy in the path, and it can present the shared secret. It costs one Node",
+    "start (~40ms) per event.",
+    "",
+    "SessionStart boots the daemon. PreToolUse is wired twice on purpose: one entry records",
+    "every call for the timeline, and a second, narrowly matched entry runs the approval gate,",
+    "because PreToolUse is the only blocking event and only a command hook can return a deny.",
+    "",
+    "Placeholders, written in the template as a name wrapped in double braces:",
+    "  APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_SECS  derived from approval.timeoutMs in ~/.grok/glance/config.json.",
+    "  HOOK_TOKEN             the secret from ~/.grok/glance/hook.secret, for a caller that",
+    "                         cannot set a header: the daemon accepts it as a ?k= query",
+    "                         parameter too. Nothing below uses it and no http hook can (see",
+    "                         above); it stays because the daemon's ?k= path is real. Note the",
+    "                         daemon also refuses any /hook/* request carrying x-forwarded-*,",
+    "                         so a reverse-proxied transport is out as well. Using this",
+    "                         placeholder makes the generated hooks.json secret-bearing, so",
+    "                         gen-hooks writes it 0600 and it must not be committed.",
+    "",
+    "Do not spell those names with their braces anywhere in this comment block: the comment is",
+    "copied verbatim into hooks.json, and substitution would happily expand it there too."
+  ],
+  "hooks": {
+    "SessionStart": [
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          {
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-up.mjs\"",
+            "timeout": 20
+          }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "PreToolUse": [
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          {
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"",
+            "timeout": 5
+          }
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "matcher": "^(Bash|Write|Edit|MultiEdit|NotebookEdit)$",
+        "hooks": [
+          {
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-approve.mjs\"",
+            "timeout": "{{APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_SECS}}"
+          }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "PostToolUse": [
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "PostToolUseFailure": [
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "UserPromptSubmit": [
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "PermissionDenied": [
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "Notification": [
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "Stop": [
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "StopFailure": [
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "SubagentStart": [
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "SubagentStop": [
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "PreCompact": [
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "PostCompact": [
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "SessionEnd": [
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node \"$GROK_PLUGIN_ROOT/bin/glance-record.mjs\"", "timeout": 5 }
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
+  }
+}
@@ -8,9 +8,10 @@
    "node": ">=20"
  },
  "scripts": {
-    "build": "npm run build:server && npm run build:web",
+    "build": "npm run build:server && npm run build:web && npm run build:hooks",
    "build:server": "tsc -p tsconfig.server.json",
    "build:web": "tsc -p tsconfig.web.json && vite build",
+    "build:hooks": "node scripts/gen-hooks.mjs",
    "dev": "vite",
    "start": "node dist/server/index.js",
    "glance": "node bin/glance"
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+/**
+ * Generate hooks/hooks.json from hooks/hooks.template.json.
+ *
+ * Runs as part of `npm run build`, and again on `glance sync-hooks`. Two jobs:
+ *
+ *   1. Make sure the /hook/* shared secret exists (mode 0600, in $GLANCE_HOME). The daemon
+ *      requires it; without it the hook scripts are just anonymous POSTs, which is what this
+ *      whole mechanism exists to stop.
+ *   2. Substitute the placeholders the template declares, so values that are really derived
+ *      from config.json - the approval hook's timeout above all - stop being hand-copied
+ *      constants that drift.
+ *
+ * It also refuses to emit a hook that cannot work. An `http` handler pointed at a non-https
+ * URL is the specific mistake that made every passive hook in this plugin a no-op for a
+ * while: Grok Build's http runner puts every URL through SSRF validation and rejects any
+ * other scheme outright (xai-grok-hooks/src/runner/http.rs, `validate_hook_url`).
+ */
+
+import fs from "node:fs";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { PLUGIN_ROOT, approvalHookTimeoutSecs, hookSecret, readConfig } from "../bin/glance-lib.mjs";
+
+const TEMPLATE = path.join(PLUGIN_ROOT, "hooks", "hooks.template.json");
+const OUTPUT = path.join(PLUGIN_ROOT, "hooks", "hooks.json");
+
+const cfg = readConfig();
+const token = hookSecret({ create: true });
+if (!token) {
+  console.error(`gen-hooks: could not create the hook secret in ${process.env.GLANCE_HOME ?? "~/.grok/glance"}`);
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+
+const timeoutSecs = approvalHookTimeoutSecs(cfg);
+
+let text = fs.readFileSync(TEMPLATE, "utf8");
+
+// The quoted form first, so a JSON-valid template can carry a value that must end up numeric.
+text = text
+  .split(`"{{APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_SECS}}"`)
+  .join(String(timeoutSecs))
+  .split("{{APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_SECS}}")
+  .join(String(timeoutSecs));
+
+const embedsToken = text.includes("{{HOOK_TOKEN}}");
+text = text.split("{{HOOK_TOKEN}}").join(token);
+
+// Trust the emitted bytes, not the placeholder: a template that mentions the placeholder in a
+// comment would otherwise ship the real secret in a world-readable file. (It did once.)
+const tokenIsInOutput = text.includes(token);
+if (tokenIsInOutput && !embedsToken) {
+  console.error("gen-hooks: the hook secret leaked into hooks.json from somewhere unexpected");
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+
+const leftover = text.match(/\{\{[A-Z_]+\}\}/);
+if (leftover) {
+  console.error(`gen-hooks: unknown placeholder ${leftover[0]} in hooks.template.json`);
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ validate */
+
+let doc;
+try {
+  doc = JSON.parse(text);
+} catch (err) {
+  console.error(`gen-hooks: template did not produce valid JSON: ${err.message}`);
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+
+const problems = [];
+let handlers = 0;
+
+for (const [event, groups] of Object.entries(doc.hooks ?? {})) {
+  if (!Array.isArray(groups)) {
+    problems.push(`${event}: expected an array of matcher groups`);
+    continue;
+  }
+  for (const group of groups) {
+    for (const h of group.hooks ?? []) {
+      handlers++;
+      const where = `${event} -> ${h.command ?? h.url ?? "(no target)"}`;
+      if (h.type !== "command" && h.type !== "http") {
+        problems.push(`${where}: type must be "command" or "http", got ${JSON.stringify(h.type)}`);
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (typeof h.timeout !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(h.timeout) || h.timeout <= 0) {
+        problems.push(`${where}: timeout must be a positive number of seconds`);
+      }
+      if (h.type === "http") {
+        // The runner rejects every scheme but https, and treats RFC1918 / CGNAT / link-local
+        // targets as SSRF. That rules out both loopback-over-http and Tailscale's 100.64/10.
+        if (!/^https:\/\//.test(h.url ?? "")) {
+          problems.push(
+            `${where}: http handlers must use an https:// URL - Grok Build's SSRF check ` +
+              `rejects anything else, so this hook would never fire`,
+          );
+        }
+      } else {
+        const script = /bin\/([A-Za-z0-9._-]+)/.exec(h.command ?? "");
+        if (!script) {
+          problems.push(`${where}: could not tell which script this command runs`);
+        } else if (!fs.existsSync(path.join(PLUGIN_ROOT, "bin", script[1]))) {
+          problems.push(`${where}: bin/${script[1]} does not exist`);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+if (problems.length) {
+  console.error("gen-hooks: refusing to write hooks.json\n");
+  for (const p of problems) console.error(`  - ${p}`);
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------------------------------------------- write */
+
+const mode = tokenIsInOutput ? 0o600 : 0o644;
+const previous = fs.existsSync(OUTPUT) ? fs.readFileSync(OUTPUT, "utf8") : null;
+
+if (previous === text) {
+  // Leave the mtime alone: a no-op build should not look like a change.
+  fs.chmodSync(OUTPUT, mode);
+  console.log(`hooks.json already current (${handlers} handlers, approval timeout ${timeoutSecs}s)`);
+} else {
+  fs.writeFileSync(OUTPUT, text, { mode });
+  fs.chmodSync(OUTPUT, mode);
+  console.log(
+    `wrote hooks/hooks.json - ${handlers} handlers, approval timeout ${timeoutSecs}s` +
+      (previous === null ? " (new file)" : ""),
+  );
+}
+
+if (tokenIsInOutput) {
+  console.warn(
+    "gen-hooks: hooks.json now contains the hook secret (via the HOOK_TOKEN placeholder); it is " +
+      "mode 0600 and must not be committed.",
+  );
+}
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ import type { IncomingMessage } from "node:http";

 export const SESSION_COOKIE = "glance_session";
 export const CSRF_HEADER = "x-glance-csrf";
+/** Shared-secret header presented by the hook scripts on /hook/*. */
+export const HOOK_HEADER = "x-glance-hook";
+/** Query-string carrier for the same secret, for hooks that cannot set headers. */
+export const HOOK_QUERY_PARAM = "k";

 export function parseCookies(header: string | undefined): Record<string, string> {
  const out: Record<string, string> = {};
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ export const paths = {
  get adminToken() {
    return path.join(glanceHome(), "admin.token");
  },
+  get hookSecret() {
+    return path.join(glanceHome(), "hook.secret");
+  },
  get events() {
    return path.join(glanceHome(), "events.jsonl");
  },
@@ -3,10 +3,13 @@
 *
 * One small http server with three kinds of caller:
 *
- *   /hook/*   the plugin's hook scripts, on loopback. /hook/approve is the blocking one.
+ *   /hook/*   the plugin's hook scripts, gated by the shared secret in hook.secret.
 *   /api/*    the web app, gated by a passkey-backed cookie session.
 *   /local/*  the `glance` CLI, gated by a rotating admin token on disk.
 *
+ * None of the three trusts the source address: `tailscale serve` proxies tailnet traffic to
+ * 127.0.0.1, so every caller looks local.
+ *
 * Everything the hooks touch is written to fail open: if this process is confused, wedged, or
 * gone, Grok Build keeps working.
 */
@@ -28,6 +31,8 @@ import {
 import {
  CSRF_HEADER,
  EnrollmentCodes,
+  HOOK_HEADER,
+  HOOK_QUERY_PARAM,
  RateLimiter,
  SESSION_COOKIE,
  buildSessionCookie,
@@ -47,7 +52,9 @@ import { SESSION_TTL_MS, WebAuthnService } from "./webauthn.js";
 import {
  destroyAuthSession,
  deviceList,
+  hookSecret,
  lookupAuthSession,
+  readHookSecretFromDisk,
  revokeCredentials,
  rotateAdminToken,
  sessionSecret,
@@ -60,6 +67,7 @@ ensureHome();
 const cfg = loadConfig();
 const secret = sessionSecret();
 const adminToken = rotateAdminToken();
+const hookToken = hookSecret();
 const webauthn = new WebAuthnService(cfg);
 const codes = new EnrollmentCodes();

@@ -93,14 +101,36 @@ function currentSession(req: http.IncomingMessage): Session | null {
  return { token, credentialId: record.credentialId, label: record.label };
 }

-function isAdmin(req: http.IncomingMessage): boolean {
-  const provided = header(req, "x-glance-admin");
+function sameSecret(provided: string | undefined | null, expected: string): boolean {
  if (!provided) return false;
  const a = Buffer.from(provided);
-  const b = Buffer.from(adminToken);
+  const b = Buffer.from(expected);
  return a.length === b.length && crypto.timingSafeEqual(a, b);
 }

+function isAdmin(req: http.IncomingMessage): boolean {
+  return sameSecret(header(req, "x-glance-admin"), adminToken);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Is this really one of our hook scripts?
+ *
+ * "It came from 127.0.0.1" proves nothing: `tailscale serve` proxies tailnet traffic to
+ * loopback, so without a check anyone on the tailnet could POST forged events into the
+ * timeline and answer /hook/approve on your behalf. Two independent barriers:
+ *
+ *   1. A shared secret from $GLANCE_HOME/hook.secret (mode 0600), presented as a header or,
+ *      for hook types that cannot set one, as `?k=`. Compared in constant time.
+ *   2. The request must not have been proxied. Tailscale stamps `x-forwarded-*` on anything
+ *      it tunnels, so their presence means the caller is not a local process — which no
+ *      real hook ever is. This keeps a leaked secret from being usable off-box.
+ */
+function isHookCaller(req: http.IncomingMessage, url: URL): boolean {
+  if (header(req, "x-forwarded-for") || header(req, "x-forwarded-proto")) return false;
+  const provided = header(req, HOOK_HEADER) ?? url.searchParams.get(HOOK_QUERY_PARAM);
+  return sameSecret(provided, hookToken);
+}
+
 /**
 * `application/json` is not a CORS-safelisted content type, so requiring it exactly means a
 * hostile page cannot post here without a preflight we never answer. The custom header on
@@ -154,6 +184,11 @@ async function handle(req: http.IncomingMessage, res: http.ServerResponse): Prom
      out.json(405, { error: "post json" });
      return;
    }
+    // Before reading a body: an unauthenticated caller gets to spend nothing here.
+    if (!isHookCaller(req, url)) {
+      out.json(403, { error: "hook token required" });
+      return;
+    }
    const payload = ((await readJson<HookPayload>(req)) ?? {}) as HookPayload;

    if (p === "/hook/record") {
@@ -163,8 +198,8 @@ async function handle(req: http.IncomingMessage, res: http.ServerResponse): Prom
    }

    if (p === "/hook/approve") {
-      // Note: this deliberately does not ingest an event. The PreToolUse http hook already
-      // recorded the tool call; recording it here too would double every entry.
+      // Note: this deliberately does not ingest an event. The PreToolUse recording hook
+      // already logged the tool call; recording it here too would double every entry.
      const decision = await broker.request(payload);
      out.json(200, decision);
      return;
@@ -194,6 +229,9 @@ async function handle(req: http.IncomingMessage, res: http.ServerResponse): Prom
        events: state.eventCount,
        webBuilt: webBuildExists(),
        home: paths.home,
+        // Would a hook script authenticate right now? The daemon holds the token it read at
+        // startup; if the file has since changed or gone, recording is silently dropping.
+        hookAuthOk: sameSecret(readHookSecretFromDisk(), hookToken),
      });
      return;
    }
@@ -69,6 +69,47 @@ export function rotateAdminToken(): string {
  return token;
 }

+/**
+ * Token the hook scripts present on /hook/*. Unlike `admin.token` this is *not* rotated on
+ * every start: hook scripts are separate short-lived processes that read the file per
+ * invocation, and a rotation mid-session would 403 whatever was already in flight.
+ *
+ * It exists because `tailscale serve` proxies tailnet traffic to 127.0.0.1, so "the request
+ * came from loopback" says nothing about who sent it. Without this, anyone on the tailnet
+ * could forge timeline events and answer approval prompts.
+ *
+ * Created exclusively (`wx`) so two hooks racing on a fresh home cannot end up with
+ * different values — the loser re-reads the winner's file.
+ */
+export function hookSecret(): string {
+  ensureHome();
+  for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 2; attempt++) {
+    try {
+      const existing = fs.readFileSync(paths.hookSecret, "utf8").trim();
+      if (existing) return existing;
+    } catch {
+      /* create below */
+    }
+    const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
+    try {
+      fs.writeFileSync(paths.hookSecret, token + "\n", { mode: 0o600, flag: "wx" });
+      return token;
+    } catch {
+      // Lost the race (or the file appeared between the read and the write): read it back.
+    }
+  }
+  return fs.readFileSync(paths.hookSecret, "utf8").trim();
+}
+
+/** Whatever is on disk right now, for diagnostics. Never creates the file. */
+export function readHookSecretFromDisk(): string | null {
+  try {
+    return fs.readFileSync(paths.hookSecret, "utf8").trim() || null;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
 /* -------------------------------------------------------------- credentials */

 export function listCredentials(): StoredCredential[] {
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ glance set-origin <https-url>      # set the public origin and WebAuthn RP ID
 glance devices                     # list enrolled devices
 glance revoke <id-prefix>          # revoke one
 glance approval <off|risky|all>    # remote approve/deny policy
-glance sync-hooks                  # rewrite hook URLs after changing the port
+glance sync-hooks                  # regenerate hooks/hooks.json from hooks/hooks.template.json
 ```

 ## Getting it onto a phone
@@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ and wait for a tap on the phone. Defaults that matter:
 - Nothing waits unless a phone is actually watching the dashboard (`requireWatcher`).
 - If nobody answers within 90s the call is **allowed**, not denied. Flip that on the phone's
  settings panel if you want the opposite.
- Every failure path is fail-open: daemon down, timeout, bad JSON — the tool call proceeds. This
-  is a convenience gate, not a security boundary.
+- Every failure path is fail-open: daemon down, timeout, bad JSON, a rejected hook secret — the tool
+  call proceeds. This is a convenience gate, not a security boundary.

 `glance approval off` (the default) means Grok Build never blocks on the phone.

@@ -73,8 +73,11 @@ and wait for a tap on the phone. Defaults that matter:
 - **"not running"** → `glance up`, then `glance logs`.
 - **Passkey prompt fails with a security error** → the phone is on a hostname the RP ID does not
  cover. Compare `glance status`'s `rp id` with the hostname in the phone's address bar.
- **Dashboard loads but shows nothing** → hooks are not firing. Check that the port in
-  `hooks/hooks.json` matches `~/.grok/glance/config.json`; `glance sync-hooks` fixes it.
+- **Dashboard loads but shows nothing** → hooks are not firing. `glance status` warns if the hook
+  secret in `$GLANCE_HOME/hook.secret` no longer matches the one the daemon loaded (events are being
+  dropped with a 403); `glance stop && glance up` fixes that. Otherwise check that
+  `hooks/hooks.json` exists and is registered — it is generated, so `glance sync-hooks` rebuilds it
+  from the template.
 - **Page says "run npm install && npm run build"** → the web bundle is missing; build it.

 ## What it deliberately does not do