/hook/record and /hook/approve accepted anything that reached the port. That is not "loopback only": `tailscale serve` proxies tailnet traffic to 127.0.0.1, so anyone who could reach the tunnel could forge timeline events and answer approval prompts. Both endpoints now require a 32-byte secret from $GLANCE_HOME/hook.secret (0600, created once, never rotated so nothing in flight is 403'd mid-session), compared in constant time before the body is read, as an x-glance-hook header or a ?k= parameter. Requests carrying x-forwarded-* are refused outright: a local hook process never sends them and a tunnelled caller always does. The check applies to /hook/* only, so the dashboard is unaffected. While wiring that up: the 13 passive `type: "http"` hooks could never have worked. Grok Build's http runner rejects every scheme but https, then resolves the host and blocks private/link-local/CGNAT addresses (validate_hook_url + is_blocked_ip), so neither loopback-over-http nor *.ts.net (100.64/10) can be a hook target - and it sends no header but Content-Type, so such a hook could not authenticate anyway. They were failing validation silently on every event. All of them are now command hooks running bin/glance-record.mjs, which costs a Node start and can present the secret. hooks.json is generated from hooks/hooks.template.json by scripts/gen-hooks.mjs (npm run build, glance sync-hooks). It creates the secret, derives the approval hook's timeout from approval.timeoutMs instead of hand-copying 125, and refuses to write a hook that cannot fire: bad type, non-positive timeout, non-https http URL, missing bin/ script, or a leftover placeholder. A template that embeds the token makes the output 0600 with a warning. Fail-open is unchanged: a missing, stale or rejected secret degrades to "no telemetry", and glance-approve.mjs still allows on every error path. glance status warns when the on-disk secret no longer matches the daemon's. Validated with the e2e suite (190 checks, including no-token/wrong-token/ same-length-token 403s, ?k= acceptance, x-forwarded-* refusal, and the recorder's fail-open paths) and a clean npm run build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
58 lines
1.6 KiB
JavaScript
Executable File
58 lines
1.6 KiB
JavaScript
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env node
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/**
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* PreToolUse hook: the remote approval gate.
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*
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* Asks the daemon what to do with this tool call. The daemon holds the request open while
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* your phone decides, then answers allow/deny. Every failure path here is fail-open —
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* a daemon that is down, slow, or confused must not be able to block your agent.
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*
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* Denying is the only outcome that changes behaviour, and approving only lets through a
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* call Grok was already about to make. This hook can never introduce a new command.
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*/
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import {
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approvalHookTimeoutSecs,
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baseUrl,
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envEnvelope,
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hookHeaders,
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postJson,
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readConfig,
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readStdinJson,
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} from "./glance-lib.mjs";
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function allow() {
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process.exit(0);
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}
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function deny(reason) {
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// Belt and braces: the documented deny signals are a JSON decision on stdout *and*
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// exit code 2. We emit both so a change in precedence cannot silently allow.
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process.stdout.write(
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JSON.stringify({ decision: "deny", reason: reason || "Denied from grok-glance" }),
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);
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process.exit(2);
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}
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const payload = envEnvelope(await readStdinJson());
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const cfg = readConfig();
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// Finish inside the hook timeout that scripts/gen-hooks.mjs wrote into hooks.json, with room
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// to spare: if Grok Build kills us first, the fail-open path below never gets to run.
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const waitMs = Math.min(
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approvalHookTimeoutSecs(cfg) * 1000 - 10_000,
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Number(cfg.approval?.timeoutMs ?? 90_000) + 15_000,
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);
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try {
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const { data } = await postJson(
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`${baseUrl(cfg)}/hook/approve`,
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payload,
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waitMs,
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hookHeaders(),
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);
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if (data && data.decision === "deny") deny(data.reason);
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allow();
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} catch {
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allow();
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}
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