forked from cloud/ovgate
iceBear67andClaude Opus 5
f37cd0a125
Multi-stage Dockerfile on debian:trixie-slim. openvpn3 and lwIP are cloned at pinned refs and handed to CMake through OVG_OPENVPN3_DIR/OVG_LWIP_DIR rather than left to FetchContent, whose GIT_TAG master would make the same Dockerfile build a different VPN client each week. The unit suite runs in the builder stage. docker/openvpngate.conf overrides only the keys whose host default is wrong inside a container -- loopback listen addresses, which make a published port reach nothing, and relative state paths, which put the node failure history on a layer that gets thrown away. Everything else stays absent and takes the compiled-in default so the file cannot drift from the code. The compose example drops every capability, runs read-only as uid 10001 and publishes both ports to host loopback: the admin endpoint has no auth and includes POST /switch. That configuration is the design constraint of this project (no root, no tun device) turned into something testable. docs/DOCKER.md 8 records what was checked against the source and what was not: this sandbox has no docker daemon, so neither the image build nor the compose file has actually been run. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
72 lines
3.5 KiB
Plaintext
72 lines
3.5 KiB
Plaintext
# openvpngate -- configuration baked into the container image.
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#
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# This file sets ONLY the keys whose host default is wrong inside a container.
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# Everything else is left absent and takes the compiled-in default, so this
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# file cannot drift from the code the way a copied-and-edited full config does.
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#
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# etc/openvpngate.conf in the source tree is the annotated reference: every key,
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# its default, and why that is the default. Read that one to change behaviour,
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# then add the key here.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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[socks5]
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# The default is 127.0.0.1, which inside a container means "reachable from this
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# container only" -- a published port would connect to nothing. Bind everywhere
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# and let the container runtime decide who gets to reach it: docker-compose.yml
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# publishes this to host loopback, not to the LAN.
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listen_address = 0.0.0.0
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listen_port = 1080
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require_auth = true
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# Credentials stay out of the image. Mount a file here (docker-compose.yml
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# does) -- SIGHUP re-reads it without dropping a live session:
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#
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# docker compose kill -s HUP openvpngate
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#
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# If this path is missing the process exits at startup with
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# "config: cannot open auth file"; if it is a *directory* -- which is what
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# Docker silently creates for a bind mount whose source does not exist -- the
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# file parses as empty and startup warns "every login will be refused". The
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# compose file uses create_host_path: false so that case fails loudly instead.
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auth_file = /etc/openvpngate/socks5.auth
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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[vpngate]
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Absolute. The default is relative (var/vpngate_cache.csv) and would resolve
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# against the working directory; inside the image that is /var/lib/openvpngate,
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# which happens to be right, but only by accident. Say it explicitly, because
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# this is also the one path that survives a container replacement and the one
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# directory a read-only rootfs still permits writing to.
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cache_path = /var/lib/openvpngate/vpngate_cache.csv
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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[selector]
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Same reasoning. Worth persisting for a different reason though: this is the
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# record of which nodes have failed on you, and losing it on every `up` means
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# walking back into the same broken node with a flattering API score.
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history_path = /var/lib/openvpngate/node_history.tsv
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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[admin]
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Bound everywhere for the same reason as socks5 above -- but this endpoint has
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# NO authentication and includes POST /switch, so whoever can reach it can force
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# your gateway onto another node. It is protected here by *publishing* rules,
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# not by the bind address: keep it on 127.0.0.1 on the host side, or set
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# enabled = false and drop the HEALTHCHECK from the Dockerfile, which probes it.
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enabled = true
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listen_address = 0.0.0.0
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listen_port = 9080
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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[log]
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# stderr, so that `docker logs` and the compose log driver see it. Logging to a
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# file inside a container puts the record on the layer that gets thrown away.
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level = info
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file = -
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