iceBear67andClaude Opus 5
5eec1940be
/hook/record and /hook/approve accepted anything that reached the port. That is not "loopback only": `tailscale serve` proxies tailnet traffic to 127.0.0.1, so anyone who could reach the tunnel could forge timeline events and answer approval prompts. Both endpoints now require a 32-byte secret from $GLANCE_HOME/hook.secret (0600, created once, never rotated so nothing in flight is 403'd mid-session), compared in constant time before the body is read, as an x-glance-hook header or a ?k= parameter. Requests carrying x-forwarded-* are refused outright: a local hook process never sends them and a tunnelled caller always does. The check applies to /hook/* only, so the dashboard is unaffected. While wiring that up: the 13 passive `type: "http"` hooks could never have worked. Grok Build's http runner rejects every scheme but https, then resolves the host and blocks private/link-local/CGNAT addresses (validate_hook_url + is_blocked_ip), so neither loopback-over-http nor *.ts.net (100.64/10) can be a hook target - and it sends no header but Content-Type, so such a hook could not authenticate anyway. They were failing validation silently on every event. All of them are now command hooks running bin/glance-record.mjs, which costs a Node start and can present the secret. hooks.json is generated from hooks/hooks.template.json by scripts/gen-hooks.mjs (npm run build, glance sync-hooks). It creates the secret, derives the approval hook's timeout from approval.timeoutMs instead of hand-copying 125, and refuses to write a hook that cannot fire: bad type, non-positive timeout, non-https http URL, missing bin/ script, or a leftover placeholder. A template that embeds the token makes the output 0600 with a warning. Fail-open is unchanged: a missing, stale or rejected secret degrades to "no telemetry", and glance-approve.mjs still allows on every error path. glance status warns when the on-disk secret no longer matches the daemon's. Validated with the e2e suite (190 checks, including no-token/wrong-token/ same-length-token 403s, ?k= acceptance, x-forwarded-* refusal, and the recorder's fail-open paths) and a clean npm run build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
36 lines
1.3 KiB
JavaScript
36 lines
1.3 KiB
JavaScript
#!/usr/bin/env node
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/**
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* Passive recorder hook: POST one lifecycle event into the daemon and get out of the way.
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*
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* Wired to every observed event. This used to be a `type: "http"` hook — no process spawn at
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* all — until it turned out that Grok Build's http runner validates the URL against its SSRF
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* rules and rejects any scheme that is not https (crates/codegen/xai-grok-hooks/src/runner/
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* http.rs, `validate_hook_url`). The daemon speaks plain http on loopback, so an http hook
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* could never reach it: those hooks were failing validation, silently, on every event.
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*
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* A command hook costs a Node start (~40ms) per event, and buys back the ability to send an
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* authentication header, which the http runner has no config surface for.
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*
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* Always exits 0. A dashboard must never be the reason a tool call fails.
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*/
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import {
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baseUrl,
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envEnvelope,
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hookHeaders,
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postJson,
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readConfig,
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readStdinJson,
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} from "./glance-lib.mjs";
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try {
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const payload = envEnvelope(await readStdinJson());
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const cfg = readConfig();
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// Short: if the daemon is not listening this must fail fast, not hold up the tool call.
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await postJson(`${baseUrl(cfg)}/hook/record`, payload, 2000, hookHeaders());
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} catch {
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// Daemon down, no secret yet, malformed payload — all the same answer: carry on.
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}
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process.exit(0);
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