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# grok-glance
A Grok Build plugin that puts a small web dashboard behind a passkey, so you can glance at what
an agent is doing from your phone — and tap **approve** or **deny** when it wants to run something
risky.
It is deliberately small: read-only, plus remote approve/deny. It cannot send prompts, edit files,
or drive a session.
```
┌────────────────────────────┐
│ ● grok-glance 2 sessions│
├────────────────────────────┤
│ Waiting on you 62s │
│ Bash · in remote-grok │
│ rm -rf ./dist │
│ ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓░░░░░░░░░░░ │
│ [ Deny ] [ Approve ] │
├────────────────────────────┤
│ remote-grok working │
│ ~/src/remote-grok │
│ Last asked: fix the flaky │
│ ⟳ Read 4s │
│ server/src/state.ts │
│ 12 tools 0 failed 0 ✗ │
├────────────────────────────┤
│ Activity │
│ ● Read state.ts 14:22 │
│ ● Bash npm test 14:21 │
└────────────────────────────┘
```
## Requirements
- Node.js 20 or newer, and npm.
- Grok Build.
- For phone access: [Tailscale](https://tailscale.com/) on both the machine and the phone. See
[Why Tailscale](#why-tailscale-and-not-just-the-lan-ip) — a LAN IP genuinely cannot work.
## Install
```sh
git clone <this repo> grok-glance
cd grok-glance
npm install && npm run build
```
The build produces `dist/server` (the daemon) and `dist/web` (the dashboard). Both are required;
the daemon serves the dashboard itself.
Then register the directory with Grok Build. Plugins are installed from a marketplace catalog, so
for a local checkout the shortest path is a one-entry catalog. Create
`.grok-plugin/marketplace.json` in a directory that contains your checkout:
```json
{
"name": "local",
"description": "Local plugins",
"owner": { "name": "me" },
"plugins": [
{
"name": "grok-glance",
"description": "Passkey-guarded phone dashboard for Grok Build.",
"category": "monitoring",
"source": { "type": "local", "path": "./grok-glance" }
}
]
}
```
…then add that marketplace and install `grok-glance` from Grok Build's `/plugin` interface.
Once installed, the daemon starts by itself: the `SessionStart` hook boots it in the background on
the first session after installation.
## Get it onto your phone
The daemon binds to `127.0.0.1` only and never opens a port to your network. Tailscale Serve
publishes it inside your tailnet with real TLS:
```sh
tailscale serve --bg 127.0.0.1:8791
tailscale serve status # note the https://<box>.<tailnet>.ts.net URL
```
Tell grok-glance which origin it is being served on — this is also the WebAuthn relying-party ID,
so it has to be exact:
```sh
node bin/glance set-origin https://<box>.<tailnet>.ts.net
```
## Enrol the phone
```sh
node bin/glance enroll
```
That prints a URL and an 8-character code, good for 10 minutes, single use:
```
Open this on your phone:
https://mybox.tailnet-1234.ts.net/?enroll
Enrollment code: K7QM4RTX
Valid for: 10 minutes (single use)
```
Open the URL on the phone, type the code, tap **Create passkey**, and confirm with Face ID / a
fingerprint / the device PIN. From then on the phone unlocks the dashboard with that passkey and
nothing else gets in.
Repeat for each device you want. `node bin/glance devices` lists them; `node bin/glance revoke
<id-prefix>` removes one (and kills its live session immediately).
## What the dashboard shows
- **Now** — the workspace, its state (working / waiting on you / idle / error / ended), the last
thing you asked, the tool currently running with a live elapsed timer, and running counts of
tools, failures and denials.
- **Sessions** — one row per live session when there is more than one; tap to filter.
- **Activity** — a timeline of prompts, tool calls with durations, failures, permission denials,
notifications, subagents, compactions, session start/end.
- **Pending approvals** — a card per waiting tool call, with the command, a countdown, and two
large buttons.
Updates arrive over Server-Sent Events. The server sends whole snapshots rather than deltas, so a
phone that slept through twenty events still wakes up showing the truth.
## Remote approve / deny
Off by default. Turn it on from the phone's settings panel, or:
```sh
node bin/glance approval risky # Bash, Write, Edit, MultiEdit, NotebookEdit
node bin/glance approval all # every tool call — noisy
node bin/glance approval off
```
Defaults worth knowing:
| Behaviour | Default | Changeable from the phone | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| Only wait when a phone is watching | on | yes | Otherwise a closed browser tab stalls the agent for 90s per tool call. |
| On timeout | allow | yes | Flip to *deny* if you would rather fail closed. |
| Timeout | 90s | no — edit `config.json` | The hook's own timeout is 125s; raising this past that would just make the hook give up first. |
| Risky-tool pattern | `^(Bash\|Write\|Edit\|MultiEdit\|NotebookEdit)$` | no — edit `config.json` | Shown on the phone but not editable: a typo'd regex would silently change what gets gated. |
**This is a convenience gate, not a security boundary.** Every failure path is fail-open: daemon
down, hook timeout, malformed response, port mismatch — the tool call proceeds. If you need calls
actually blocked, use Grok Build's own permission settings.
## CLI
`bin/glance` is plain Node with no dependencies. Run it as `node bin/glance <command>`.
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
| `status` | Running? On which origin, with how many devices? |
| `up` | Start the daemon in the background |
| `serve` | Run it in the foreground (for debugging) |
| `stop` | Stop it |
| `logs` | Last 60 lines of the daemon log |
| `enroll` | Mint a one-time enrolment code and URL |
| `set-origin <url>` | Set the public https origin and RP ID |
| `devices` | List enrolled devices |
| `revoke <id-prefix>` | Revoke a device |
| `approval <off\|risky\|all>` | Set the approval policy |
| `sync-hooks` | Rewrite hook URLs after changing the port |
## Files and configuration
Everything lives in `~/.grok/glance` (mode 0700), or `$GLANCE_HOME` if you set it:
| File | Contents |
|---|---|
| `config.json` | Port, bind host, public origin, RP ID, approval settings |
| `credentials.json` | Enrolled passkeys — credential IDs, public keys, counters. No secrets of yours. |
| `auth-sessions.json` | Live dashboard sessions, stored as SHA-256 hashes of the cookie tokens |
| `secret.key` | 32-byte HMAC key used to sign session cookies |
| `admin.token` | Rotated every daemon start; authenticates the CLI |
| `events.jsonl` | Append-only event log, one JSON object per line, rotated at 5 MB |
| `daemon.log` | Daemon stdout/stderr |
Three environment variables override `config.json`, which is mostly useful for testing a second
instance without touching your real one:
| Variable | Effect |
|---|---|
| `GLANCE_HOME` | Where all of the above lives. Read by the daemon, the CLI, and the hook scripts. |
| `GLANCE_PORT` | Port to listen on (and, for the CLI and hooks, to talk to) |
| `GLANCE_ORIGIN` | Public origin, as if set with `set-origin` — but not persisted |
To change the port, edit `config.json`, then run `node bin/glance sync-hooks` so the hook URLs in
`hooks/hooks.json` match. Restart the daemon afterwards.
## Security notes
**Network surface.** The daemon listens on `127.0.0.1:8791` and makes no outbound connections of
its own. Three classes of caller:
| Path | Caller | Authentication |
|---|---|---|
| `/hook/record`, `/hook/approve` | Grok Build's hooks, from this machine | none — loopback only |
| `/api/*`, `/events` | the dashboard | passkey session cookie + CSRF header |
| `/local/*` | the `glance` CLI | rotating admin token from `admin.token` |
`/local/*` is token-gated rather than "is it from localhost", because `tailscale serve` proxies
remote traffic to `127.0.0.1` — the daemon cannot tell a local caller from a tunnelled one by
address alone.
**Session cookie** is `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Strict`, HMAC-signed, and `Secure` whenever the request
arrived over https. Only a SHA-256 hash of the token is stored, compared in constant time. Sessions
last 30 days; revoking a device drops its session at once.
**Cross-site defence.** Every POST must carry exactly `content-type: application/json`, which is
not a CORS-safelisted type, so a hostile page cannot post here without a preflight that is never
answered. `/api/*` additionally requires an `x-glance-csrf` header. The pages themselves are served
with a strict CSP (`script-src 'self'`, no framing, no form actions) and `no-store`.
**User verification is required**, for both enrolment and sign-in: the phone asks for a biometric
or PIN every time, so a stolen unlocked phone is not automatically a way in. Passkeys are created
as resident keys, so the phone offers the right one without you typing a username.
**Rate limits.** Authentication attempts are capped (40 per 5 minutes), enrolment attempts more
tightly (12 per 5 minutes, and a code burns itself after 5 wrong guesses). The limiter is keyed
globally on purpose: behind a tunnel every request arrives from `127.0.0.1`, so per-IP buckets
would be one bucket wearing a hat.
**What crosses the wire.** Tool names, truncated arguments, prompt first lines, file paths,
durations, and exit statuses — a summary, not a transcript. Known secret shapes are redacted before
storage: `sk-`/`rk-`/`pk-` keys, `xai-` keys, GitHub and Slack tokens, AWS access key IDs, JWTs,
PEM private-key blocks, `Authorization:`/`Bearer` headers, and `password`/`secret`/`token`/`api_key`
assignments. This is a filter, not a guarantee — a secret in an unusual shape will show up in the
timeline. Treat the dashboard as being as sensitive as your terminal.
**Threat model.** grok-glance assumes the machine it runs on is trusted. It protects against
someone else on your tailnet, or a browser tab you left open, reaching the dashboard. It does not
protect against a local attacker who can read `~/.grok/glance` — with `admin.token` they can enrol
their own device.
### Why Tailscale, and not just the LAN IP?
WebAuthn will not run outside a secure context, and — separately — a bare IP address cannot be a
relying-party ID. So `http://192.168.1.20:8791` can never hold a passkey, no matter what the
browser is willing to render. You need a hostname with valid TLS. Tailscale Serve gives you one for
free, with the tunnel closed to everything outside your tailnet.
Any other route to a real https hostname works too: set `origin` in `config.json` (or use
`set-origin`) to whatever your reverse proxy terminates on. If you put grok-glance behind a proxy
reachable from the public internet, the passkey gate is the only thing standing in front of it.
Changing the origin changes the RP ID, and **passkeys are bound to the RP ID** — existing devices
stop working and must be enrolled again.
## Hook wiring
`hooks/hooks.json` subscribes to all 14 lifecycle events. Passive events use `type: "http"`: they
POST straight into the daemon with no process spawn, so they cost close to nothing per tool call
and quietly do nothing when the daemon is down.
Two exceptions:
- `SessionStart` runs `bin/glance-up.mjs`, which is what boots the daemon.
- `PreToolUse` is wired **twice** — an `http` entry that records every call for the timeline, and a
`command` entry matching only `^(Bash|Write|Edit|MultiEdit|NotebookEdit)$` that runs
`bin/glance-approve.mjs`. PreToolUse is the only blocking event, and a command hook is the only
documented way to return a deny decision, so the gate has to be a spawned process; keeping the
match narrow means the cost is paid only for calls that could actually need a tap.
The hook scripts use nothing but the Node standard library and always exit 0 unless they are
deliberately denying.
## Deliberately omitted
Not oversights — decisions:
- **Sending prompts or steering the session.** Hooks cannot inject input, so a phone-to-agent
channel would need a second transport and a much larger threat model.
- **Full transcripts and tool output.** Summaries only. Streaming assistant text through a phone
would mean shipping your codebase through it.
- **Push notifications.** Needs a VAPID key, a service worker, and a subscription store, for a
dashboard you open on purpose.
- **Multi-user accounts and roles.** One user, several devices.
- **Diff views, file browsing, cost/token charts, log search, session resume.** All out of scope
for a glance.
- **Editing the risky-tool pattern from the phone.** Shown but not editable: a typo'd regex there
would silently change what gets gated. Edit `config.json` instead.
## Licence
MIT.