Authenticate /hook/*, and make every hook a command hook

/hook/record and /hook/approve accepted anything that reached the port. That is
not "loopback only": `tailscale serve` proxies tailnet traffic to 127.0.0.1, so
anyone who could reach the tunnel could forge timeline events and answer
approval prompts. Both endpoints now require a 32-byte secret from
$GLANCE_HOME/hook.secret (0600, created once, never rotated so nothing in
flight is 403'd mid-session), compared in constant time before the body is
read, as an x-glance-hook header or a ?k= parameter. Requests carrying
x-forwarded-* are refused outright: a local hook process never sends them and a
tunnelled caller always does. The check applies to /hook/* only, so the
dashboard is unaffected.

While wiring that up: the 13 passive `type: "http"` hooks could never have
worked. Grok Build's http runner rejects every scheme but https, then resolves
the host and blocks private/link-local/CGNAT addresses (validate_hook_url +
is_blocked_ip), so neither loopback-over-http nor *.ts.net (100.64/10) can be a
hook target - and it sends no header but Content-Type, so such a hook could not
authenticate anyway. They were failing validation silently on every event. All
of them are now command hooks running bin/glance-record.mjs, which costs a Node
start and can present the secret.

hooks.json is generated from hooks/hooks.template.json by scripts/gen-hooks.mjs
(npm run build, glance sync-hooks). It creates the secret, derives the approval
hook's timeout from approval.timeoutMs instead of hand-copying 125, and refuses
to write a hook that cannot fire: bad type, non-positive timeout, non-https
http URL, missing bin/ script, or a leftover placeholder. A template that
embeds the token makes the output 0600 with a warning.

Fail-open is unchanged: a missing, stale or rejected secret degrades to "no
telemetry", and glance-approve.mjs still allows on every error path. glance
status warns when the on-disk secret no longer matches the daemon's.

Validated with the e2e suite (190 checks, including no-token/wrong-token/
same-length-token 403s, ?k= acceptance, x-forwarded-* refusal, and the
recorder's fail-open paths) and a clean npm run build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
iceBear67
2026-08-09 04:52:17 +00:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent b3b6bf3f70
commit 5eec1940be
15 changed files with 661 additions and 81 deletions
+4 -1
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import {
baseUrl,
envEnvelope,
glanceHome,
hookHeaders,
isDaemonUp,
postJson,
readConfig,
@@ -59,7 +60,9 @@ const cfg = readConfig();
try {
const up = await ensureDaemon(cfg);
if (up) {
await postJson(`${baseUrl(cfg)}/hook/record`, payload, 2500);
// hookHeaders() is read here, not at import time: on a first-ever run the daemon we just
// spawned is what created hook.secret.
await postJson(`${baseUrl(cfg)}/hook/record`, payload, 2500, hookHeaders());
}
} catch {
// Fail open, always.