Authenticate /hook/*, and make every hook a command hook
/hook/record and /hook/approve accepted anything that reached the port. That is not "loopback only": `tailscale serve` proxies tailnet traffic to 127.0.0.1, so anyone who could reach the tunnel could forge timeline events and answer approval prompts. Both endpoints now require a 32-byte secret from $GLANCE_HOME/hook.secret (0600, created once, never rotated so nothing in flight is 403'd mid-session), compared in constant time before the body is read, as an x-glance-hook header or a ?k= parameter. Requests carrying x-forwarded-* are refused outright: a local hook process never sends them and a tunnelled caller always does. The check applies to /hook/* only, so the dashboard is unaffected. While wiring that up: the 13 passive `type: "http"` hooks could never have worked. Grok Build's http runner rejects every scheme but https, then resolves the host and blocks private/link-local/CGNAT addresses (validate_hook_url + is_blocked_ip), so neither loopback-over-http nor *.ts.net (100.64/10) can be a hook target - and it sends no header but Content-Type, so such a hook could not authenticate anyway. They were failing validation silently on every event. All of them are now command hooks running bin/glance-record.mjs, which costs a Node start and can present the secret. hooks.json is generated from hooks/hooks.template.json by scripts/gen-hooks.mjs (npm run build, glance sync-hooks). It creates the secret, derives the approval hook's timeout from approval.timeoutMs instead of hand-copying 125, and refuses to write a hook that cannot fire: bad type, non-positive timeout, non-https http URL, missing bin/ script, or a leftover placeholder. A template that embeds the token makes the output 0600 with a warning. Fail-open is unchanged: a missing, stale or rejected secret degrades to "no telemetry", and glance-approve.mjs still allows on every error path. glance status warns when the on-disk secret no longer matches the daemon's. Validated with the e2e suite (190 checks, including no-token/wrong-token/ same-length-token 403s, ?k= acceptance, x-forwarded-* refusal, and the recorder's fail-open paths) and a clean npm run build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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co-authored by
Claude Opus 5
parent
b3b6bf3f70
commit
5eec1940be
+4
-1
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import {
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baseUrl,
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envEnvelope,
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glanceHome,
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hookHeaders,
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isDaemonUp,
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postJson,
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readConfig,
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@@ -59,7 +60,9 @@ const cfg = readConfig();
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try {
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const up = await ensureDaemon(cfg);
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if (up) {
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await postJson(`${baseUrl(cfg)}/hook/record`, payload, 2500);
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// hookHeaders() is read here, not at import time: on a first-ever run the daemon we just
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// spawned is what created hook.secret.
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await postJson(`${baseUrl(cfg)}/hook/record`, payload, 2500, hookHeaders());
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}
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} catch {
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// Fail open, always.
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